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The Security Council,

Recalling the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and *reaffirming* its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security,

Recalling its resolutions 1325 (2000), 1809 (2007), 2033 (2012), 2167 (2014), 2171 (2014), 2242 (2015) and 2320 (2016), as well as the Statements of its President of 16 December 2014 (S/PRST/2014/27), 25 November 2015 (S/PRST/2015/22) and 31 December 2015 (S/PRST/2015/26),

Affirming that lasting peace is not achieved nor sustained by military and technical engagements alone, but through political solutions and strongly convinced that they should guide the design and deployment of United Nations peacekeeping operations,

Underscoring the importance of peacekeeping as the most effective tools available to the United Nations in the promotion and maintenance of international peace and security,

Reaffirming its resolve to strengthen the central role of the United Nations in peacekeeping and to ensure the effective functioning of the collective security system established by the Charter of the United Nations,

Further reaffirming the basic principles of peacekeeping, including consent of the parties, impartiality, and non-use of force, except in self-defence and defence of the mandate, and *recognizing* that the mandate of each peacekeeping mission is specific to the need and situation of the country concerned, and that the Security Council expects full delivery of the mandates it authorizes,

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Underscoring the importance it places on the safety and security of peacekeepers in the field and the need for the Secretary-General and Troop- and Police-Contributing Countries, respectively, to work together to ensure that all peacekeepers in the field are willing, capable and equipped to effectively and safely implement their mandate,

Recognizing the pledges made by a number of Member States to help meet persistent capacity gaps and improve the performance and capabilities of uniformed and civilian personnel made at various multilateral meetings held in 2015 and 2016, including the "Leaders' Summit on Peacekeeping" held in New York in September 2015, the "UN Peacekeeping Defence Ministerial" held in London in September 2016 and the "Ministerial Conference on Peacekeeping in the Francophone Area" held in Paris in October 2016, and *underscoring* the need to fulfil these pledges in order to contribute to improving the overall effectiveness and efficiency of United Nations peacekeeping,

Recalling the Secretary-General's report entitled "The Future of United Nations Peace Operations: Implementation of the Recommendations of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations" (A/70/357-S/2015/682) and the recommendations of the report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (A/70/95-S/2015/446), which became the basis for further decisions of the Member States in the Security Council, and Fourth and Fifth Committees of the General Assembly, as well as the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations,

Recognizing that cooperation with regional and subregional organizations in matters relating to the maintenance of peace and security, and consistent with Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, can improve collective security,

Reaffirming that States bear the primary responsibility for protection of civilians throughout their whole territory while mindful of the important role United Nations peacekeeping operations play in this regard and further recognizing the role that regional and subregional organizations can play in the protection of civilians, and in particular women and children affected by armed conflict, as well as in the prevention of and response to sexual and gender-based violence in armed conflicts and post-conflict situations,

Recognizing the indispensable role of women in United Nations peacekeeping, including supporting the critical role that women play in all peace and security efforts, including those to prevent and resolve conflict and mitigate its impact, *welcoming* efforts to incentivize greater numbers of women in military and police deployed in United Nations peacekeeping operations and *recalling* its resolution 2242 (2015) and its aspiration to increase the number of women in military and police contingents of United Nations peacekeeping operations,

Reaffirming its support for the United Nations zero-tolerance policy on all forms of sexual exploitation and abuse, *welcoming* the Secretary-General's continued efforts to implement and reinforce this policy,

Noting the signing, on 19 April 2017, of the Joint United Nations-African Union Framework for enhanced partnership between the United Nations Secretariat and the African Union Commission for peace and security in the African continent,

Taking note of the ongoing efforts of the African Union and the subregional organizations, within the framework of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), to strengthen their capacity and undertake peace support operations in the continent, in accordance with Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, particularly the African Standby Force and its Rapid Deployment Capability,

Further taking note of the Secretary General's report on options for authorization and support for African Union Peace Support Operations pursuant to Security Council resolution 2320 (2016), including the financing models as well as the joint planning and consultative decision-making and oversight proposal presented in that report, and noting the need to further develop this work, in consultation with the African Union,

Recalling further its encouragement for the African Union to finalize its human rights and Conduct and Discipline Compliance frameworks for African Union peace support operations, to achieve greater accountability, transparency, and compliance with international human rights law and international humanitarian law, as applicable, and with United Nations conduct and discipline standards, and *underscoring* the importance of these commitments as well as the requirement for oversight by the Security Council of operations authorized by the Security Council and under the Security Council's authority consistent with Chapter VIII of the Charter,

Recalling the commitment made by the Assembly of the African Union in January 2015, at its 24th Ordinary Session to fund 25% of the cost of its peace and security efforts, including peace support operations to be phased in over a five-year period, as reaffirmed at the 25th Ordinary Session in Johannesburg in July 2015, *re-emphasizing* that consultative analysis and joint planning with the United Nation is critical to developing joint recommendations on the scope and resource implications of potential peace support operations, assessing action and undertaking missions where appropriate, and regularly reporting on such actions when taken and *stressing* the importance of full compliance with African Union and United Nations human rights and conduct and discipline policies and arrangements,

Taking into account its key role in strengthening United Nations peacekeeping and reaffirming its commitment to continue to consider the relevant recommendations of the Secretary-General's report (A/70/357-S/2015/682) as well as their implementation, as necessary,

1. *Stresses* that the primacy of politics should be the hallmark of the approach of the United Nations to the resolution of conflict, including through mediation, the monitoring of ceasefires, assistance to the implementation of peace accords;

2. *Further stresses* that prevention of conflicts remains a primary responsibility of States and actions undertaken within the framework of conflict prevention by the United Nations should support and complement, as appropriate, the conflict prevention roles of national Governments;

3. *Reaffirms* the duty of all States to settle their international disputes by peaceful means, inter alia through negotiation, enquiry, good offices, mediation, conciliation, arbitration and judicial settlement, or other peaceful means of their own choice;

4. *Recognizes* that good offices of the Secretary-General can help resolve conflicts, and *encourages* the Secretary-General to continue to use mediation to help resolve conflicts peacefully, working in coordination and closely with the relevant regional and subregional organizations, including the African Union, as appropriate;

5. *Further recognizes* the critical importance of improving accountability, transparency, efficiency and effectiveness in the performance of United Nations peacekeeping operations including through further consideration of the relevant recommendations of the report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (A/70/95-S/2015/446) and the relevant recommendations of the

Secretary-General's report (A/70/357-S/2015/682), in accordance with existing purviews and procedures;

6. *Emphasizes* the importance of ensuring agile and flexible field support by promoting innovation for better delivery and results with a view to enhancing the overall effectiveness of peacekeeping operations;

7. *Welcomes* the intention of the Secretary-General to introduce peacekeeping reform within the Secretariat as well as on the ground and *underscores* the need to continue to engage and seek the support of Member States to ensure transparency;

8. *Takes note* of the Secretary-General's initiatives to pursue structural reform of the Secretariat to reinforce the United Nations peace and security architecture; *encourages* the Secretary-General to continue to engage with the Security Council and the General Assembly and relevant Committees on his initiatives;

9. *Underlines* the importance of adequate implementation and follow-up of United Nations peacekeeping reform in accordance with existing mandates and procedures; *requests* its Working Group established in accordance with the Presidential Statement of 31 January 2001 (S/PRST/2001/3), to review reform initiatives in close cooperation with other Member States, including Troop- and Police-Contributing Countries and host countries;

10. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide a comprehensive annual briefing to the Security Council on reform of United Nations peacekeeping every twelve months to be followed by a debate, *further requests* the Secretary-General to provide updates to the Security Council, as part of his comprehensive briefing, on the continuous efforts made in filling the existing gaps in terms of force generation and capabilities as well as other relevant aspects necessary for peacekeeping to effectively and appropriately respond to peace and security challenges; and *further requests* the Secretary-General to provide recommendations to the Security Council within 90 days of the adoption of this resolution on a mechanism to fill these gaps including through more effective and efficient training and capacity-building;

11. *Underscores* the need to enhance the overall effectiveness and efficiency of United Nations peacekeeping by improving mission planning, increasing the number of relevant pledges of capabilities, including niche capabilities, enablers, engineering, medical and rapid deployment units as well as reinforcing peacekeeping performance through training and to fulfil the pledges made by a number of Member States at the various multilateral meetings held in 2015 and 2016;

12. *Reaffirms* its determination to pursue more prioritization when evaluating, mandating and reviewing United Nations peacekeeping operations, including through strengthening Triangular consultations with Troop- and Police-Contributing Countries and the Secretariat, strengthening existing formal mechanisms, and underlining the shared responsibility for meaningful, inclusive, active and dynamic consultations, as well as enhancing its dialogue with host countries, with the aim of fully and successfully implementing peacekeeping mandates;

13. *Further reaffirms* its ongoing efforts to review peacekeeping operations to ensure maximum effectiveness and efficiency on the ground, and to deepen these efforts in partnership with Troop- and Police-Contributing Countries and other relevant stakeholders, and requests the Secretary-General to ensure data streams related to the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations, including peacekeeping

performance data, are centralized to improve analytics and evaluation of mission operations, based on clear and well identified benchmarks;

14. *Further reaffirms* its commitment to the cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations and arrangements in matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security, and consistent with Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, which can improve collective security;

15. *Reiterates* its determination to take effective steps to further enhance the relationship between the United Nations and regional organizations, in particular the African Union, in accordance with Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter;

16. *Underlines* the importance of accelerating the operationalization of the African Standby Force and *calls upon* the United Nations and Member States to continue to support within the existing means the strengthening of the African Standby Force's readiness as the overarching framework for African peace support operations, and *requests* the Secretary-General to report on the progress achieved in this regard in his next Report on Strengthening the Partnership between the United Nations and the African Union on Issues of Peace and Security in Africa, including the Work of the United Nations Office to the African Union (UNOAU), and *encourages* the UN Secretariat and the AUC to collaborate towards strengthening the APSA by supporting the APSA road map and silencing the guns master roadmap and their respective work plans;

17. *Reiterates* that regional organizations have the responsibility to secure human, financial, logistical and other resources for their organizations and *recognizes* that ad hoc and unpredictable financing arrangements for African Union led peace support operations authorized by the Security Council and consistent with Chapter VIII of the Charter may impact the effectiveness of these peace support operations;

18. *Expresses its intention* to give further consideration to practical steps that can be taken, and the conditions necessary, to establish the mechanism through which African Union led peace support operations authorized by the Security Council and under the Security Council's authority under Chapter VIII of the Charter could be partly financed through United Nations assessed contributions, on a case by case basis, in compliance with relevant agreed standards and mechanisms to ensure strategic and financial oversight and accountability, and taking into account the work undertaken by the United Nations Secretariat and the African Union Commission in this regard, acknowledging the development of operations mandated or authorized by the AU;

19. *Reiterates* its request to the Secretary-General, where applicable, to continue to take steps to enhance measures in United Nations peacekeeping operations against all forms of abuse and exploitation of civilians by any member of the United Nations peacekeeping operations, *urges* Troop- and Police-Contributing Countries to take preventive and disciplinary action to ensure that such acts are properly investigated and punished in cases involving their personnel; *reiterates* its call for all non-United Nations forces authorized under a Security Council mandate to take adequate measures to prevent and combat impunity for sexual exploitation and abuse, hold perpetrators accountable and repatriate units when there is credible evidence of widespread or systematic sexual exploitation and abuse by those units;

20. *Requests* the Secretary-General, in coordination with the African Union, to present in his next Report on Strengthening the Partnership between the United Nations and the African Union on Issues of Peace and Security in Africa, including the Work of the United Nations Office to the African Union (UNOAU), a reporting

framework which would establish clear, consistent and predictable reporting channels, including fiduciary and mandate delivery, between the Secretariat, the Commission and the two Councils, as well as standardized reporting requirements;

21. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

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Letter dated 15 September 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith information bulletins from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence regarding the status of implementation of the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic for the period 13-15 September 2017 (see annex).

I should be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) V. **Nebenzia**

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Annex to the letter dated 15 September 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Information bulletin from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence regarding the status of implementation of the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas (13 September 2017)

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Monitoring groups have continued to monitor observance of the ceasefire regime as part of implementing the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic, signed by the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran on 4 May 2017.

The situation in the de-escalation areas has been assessed as stable.

Over the past 24 hours, the Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the ceasefire regime has reported three incidents of gunfire in the following governorates: one in Damascus, one in Dar'a and one in Ladhiqiyah.

The Turkish representative office has reported three violations in Damascus governorate.

Most of the incidents of small arms being fired indiscriminately have been reported in areas controlled by fighters of the terrorist groups Nusrah Front and Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

Over the past 24 hours, the Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic has carried out one humanitarian operation: the delivery of 1.7 tons of food to the local population of Wadhah in Aleppo governorate.

In total, 1,609 humanitarian operations have been carried out.

The total weight of humanitarian cargo delivered is 2,153.8 tons.

No United Nations humanitarian operations were carried out.

Over the past 24 hours, medical assistance has been provided to 396 residents.

In total, medical assistance has been provided to 56,259 residents.

Reconciliation of opposing sides

Over the past 24 hours, no ceasefire agreements have been signed.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process is unchanged — it is still 2,235.

Negotiations on joining the ceasefire regime continued with armed opposition groups in Aleppo, Damascus, Hama, Homs and Qunaytirah governorates.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 233.

Information bulletin from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence regarding the status of implementation of the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas (14 September 2017)

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Monitoring groups have continued to monitor observance of the ceasefire regime as part of implementing the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic, signed by the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran on 4 May 2017.

The situation in the de-escalation areas has been assessed as stable.

Over the past 24 hours, the Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the ceasefire regime has reported six incidents of gunfire in the following governorates: four in Aleppo, one in Damascus and one in Dar'a.

The Turkish representative office has reported three violations: two in Damascus governorate and one in Ladhiqiyah governorate.

Most of the incidents of small arms being fired indiscriminately have been reported in areas controlled by fighters of the terrorist groups Nusrah Front and ISIL.

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

Over the past 24 hours, the Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic has carried out one humanitarian operation: the delivery of 4.3 tons of food to the local population of Dayr Ba'albah in Homs governorate.

In total, 1,610 humanitarian operations have been carried out.

The total weight of humanitarian cargo delivered is 2,158.1 tons.

The United Nations carried out one humanitarian operation: the delivery of food and medicine with a total weight of 132 tons to Tall Shihab in Dar'a governorate.

Over the past 24 hours, medical assistance has been provided to 117 residents.

In total, medical assistance has been provided to 56,412 residents.

Reconciliation of opposing sides

Over the past 24 hours, no ceasefire agreements have been signed.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process is unchanged — it is still 2,235.

Negotiations on joining the ceasefire regime continued with armed opposition groups in Aleppo, Damascus, Hama, Homs and Qunaytirah governorates.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 233.

Information bulletin from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence regarding the status of implementation of the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas (15 September 2017)

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Monitoring groups have continued to monitor observance of the ceasefire regime as part of implementing the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic, signed by the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran on 4 May 2017.

The situation in the de-escalation areas has been assessed as stable.

Over the past 24 hours, the Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the ceasefire regime has reported six incidents of gunfire in the following governorates: three in Damascus, two in Aleppo and one in Hama.

The Turkish representative office has reported four violations: two in Damascus governorate and two in Hama governorate.

Most of the incidents of small arms being fired indiscriminately have been reported in areas controlled by fighters of the terrorist groups Nusrah Front and ISIL.

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

Over the past 24 fours, the Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic has carried out one humanitarian operation: the delivery of 1.7 tons of food to the local population of Umm al-Hayat in Aleppo governorate.

In total, 3,611 humanitarian operations have been carried out.

The total weight of humanitarian cargo delivered is 2,159.8 tons.

Over the past 24 hours, medical assistance has been provided to 270 residents.

In total, medical assistance has been provided to 56,682 residents.

Reconciliation of opposing sides

Over the past 24 hours, no ceasefire agreements have been signed.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process is unchanged — it is still 2,235.

Negotiations on joining the ceasefire regime continued with armed opposition groups in Aleppo, Damascus, Hama, Homs and Qunaytirah governorates.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 233.

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Seventy-second session
Agenda item 39
The situation in Afghanistan

Security Council
Seventy-second year

The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security

Report of the Secretary-General

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to General Assembly resolution 68/11 and Security Council resolution 2344 (2017), in which I was requested to report every three months on developments in Afghanistan.

2. The report provides an update on the activities of the United Nations in Afghanistan, including political, humanitarian, development and human rights efforts, since the issuance of my previous report on 15 June 2017 (A/71/932-S/2017/508). It also provides a summary of key political and security developments and regional and international events relating to Afghanistan. In the interim, a special report on the strategic review of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) was issued on 10 August 2017 (A/72/312-S/2017/696).

II. Relevant developments

3. The National Unity Government faced increasingly vocal opposition from a variety of political figures, who became more active in mobilizing supporters following the announcement of an electoral date for 2018. The formation of the "Council for the Salvation of Afghanistan", which unites leading figures from three major political parties, created an opposition bloc with a support base predominately in the north of Afghanistan as well as affiliations in other parts of the country. The Independent Election Commission announced 7 July 2018 as the date for parliamentary and district council elections and made progress on electoral preparations, including steps towards improving the credibility of the electoral process, despite persistent public scepticism. The security situation remained highly volatile, as the Government and the Taliban exchanged control of several district centres during the reporting period, with casualties on both sides. A number of high-profile security incidents, including a suicide attack on a Shia mosque in the city of

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Herat on 1 August, mass killings in Sari Pul Province from 3 to 5 August and a suicide attack on a Shia mosque in Kabul on 25 August, drew widespread condemnation while prompting fears of rising sectarian tension and further intensifying public criticism of the Government for not being able to provide security. Civilians continued to suffer disproportionately from the conflict, with continuing high levels of civilian casualties and displacement. Relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan showed signs of improved cooperation in some areas. Afghanistan continued its regional engagement both bilaterally and through multilateral forums, in particular with the five Central Asian States. There was no tangible progress towards a peace process between the Government and the Taliban.

A. Political developments

4. My previous periodic report was issued in the middle of a month of political crisis, precipitated by the massive truck-borne suicide attack on 31 May, which was carried out in the heart of the city of Kabul. The attack resulted in demonstrations against the Government, which was accused by protestors of failing to protect its citizens. This perception was further exacerbated when several demonstrators were killed during the protests, allegedly by security officials. A subsequent attack at the funeral of one of the deceased protestors could have led to the killing of a number of key members of the Jamiat-e Islami political party, including the Chief Executive, Abdullah Abdullah, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Salahuddin Rabbani. This led prominent Jamiat-affiliated politicians to publicly accuse the Government of a conspiracy and prolonged public demonstrations and street blockades in Kabul. Mr. Abdullah declined to resign, despite calls to do so from some prominent Jamiat-e Islami members. On 20 June, the Government forcibly removed the last street blockades in Kabul, during which one protestor was killed and five others injured by Afghan security forces, leading to fears of escalating violence. This did not materialize, and the Eid holidays marking the end of Ramadan gave way to a period of relative calm. However, the events of the month had caused a significant shift in the political climate, with a marked rift in the relationship between the President, Ashraf Ghani, and key members of the Jamiat-e Islami party.

5. In this political and security context, a new political dynamic emerged, characterized by a consolidation of authority within the National Unity Government around the President. Mr. Ghani and Mr. Abdullah reached consensus on high-level appointments, which had previously represented a source of contention between the two leaders. During the reporting period, the President nominated several new ministers, including a new Minister of the Interior and a new head of the Independent Directorate of Local Governance, and replaced all nine commissioners of the Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission. However, the parliamentary approval process for ministers remained challenging, as the legislature continued to assert its prerogatives against the executive branch; a number of ministers are currently serving in an acting capacity.

6. Relations between the President and Jamiat-e Islami were further exacerbated following a tense stand-off in Mazar-e Sharif on 14 August between a member of the Provincial Council, Asif Momand, and forces loyal to the Governor of Balkh Province, Atta Noor, who is also the Chief Executive of the Jamiat party. The incident culminated in a shoot-out between the Governor's forces and armed Hizb-i Islami affiliates, who supported Mr. Momand. Subsequently, Mr. Momand was transferred to the custody of the National Directorate of Security, where he remained until his release on 17 August.

7. Relations also remained tense between the President and the Junbish-e Milli party, whose leader, the First Vice-President, Abdul Rashid Dostum, remains under indictment for the alleged arbitrary detention and sexual assault of a political rival in November 2016. Despite persistent rumours of his imminent return and an aborted attempt to do so on 17 July, Mr. Dostum remained in Ankara, where he has officially been undergoing medical treatment since 19 May. On 9 July, pretrial proceedings began in the case against the First Vice-President and nine co-defendants, none of whom appeared before the court.

8. On 22 June, the Independent Election Commission announced 7 July 2018 as the date for parliamentary and district council elections. The announcement had a galvanizing effect on political actors and provided a new outlet for political activity, including among groups that had previously called for non-constitutional measures to replace the National Unity Government. In the following weeks, a number of opposition figures and groups began to build coalitions aimed at contesting the elections. These emerging opposition coalitions coalesced around criticism of the Government and the deteriorating security and economic situation, as well as perceptions of a growing concentration of power within the Presidential Palace.

9. The largest new group announced itself in Ankara on 29 June, as Mr. Dostum, Mr. Noor and the Second Deputy Chief Executive, Mohammad Mohaqiq, declared an alliance, the "Coalition for the Salvation of Afghanistan", which unites figures from the Jamiat-e Islami, Hezb-i Wahdat Islami Mardum-e Afghanistan and Junbish-e Milli parties and draws from sizeable constituencies within the Tajik, Uzbek and Hazara communities. The cooperation between Jamiat and Junbish was a particularly notable development, given the parties' long and occasionally violent rivalry. To date, the alliance has mobilized its northern support base while attempting to forge links with other opposition figures. Mr. Noor led a coalition rally in Mazar-e Sharif on 1 August, which was attended by some 3,000 people; Jamiat figures such as Mr. Abdullah and Mr. Rabbani were absent. Another rally was held in Jalalabad on the same day to inaugurate the "Council of the East", consisting of parliamentarians from the eastern provinces, who subsequently travelled to Mazar-e Sharif for discussions with Mr. Noor. Yet another group of opposition figures announced the formation of Mehwar-e Mardom-e Afghanistan ("Axis of the People of Afghanistan"), which features a number of Cabinet officials from the former Karzai administration.

10. Other groupings also appeared energized by the announcement of an election date. The Afghanistan Protection and Stability Council, which includes the former Minister of the Interior, Umar Daudzai, and the former mujahidin leader, Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, made public statements and began to seek out allies. Similarly, the leader of the New National Front, Anwar ul-Haq Ahady, held several meetings with other opposition figures, including with Mr. Dostum and representatives of the Afghanistan Protection and Stability Council. The Hizb-i Islami political grouping also took steps towards election preparations. At a press conference on 6 July, its founder, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, announced the unification of the registered party Hizb-i Islami Afghanistan with his own Hizb-i Islami Gulbuddin faction. He also stated that the new party would continue to support the political system. However, the two wings of the party continued to retain separate party structures in many provinces.

11. Street demonstrations decreased in size and intensity during the reporting period. Following the removal of its protest tents from the streets of Kabul in late June, the Tajik-dominated Uprising for Change movement redirected its focus on initiating cooperation with parts of the political establishment. On 23 July, the President met with activists of the Hazara-dominated Enlightenment Movement and

promised a joint commission to explore development opportunities in the Hazara-majority Central Highlands.

12. Following the announcement of an election date, technical and operational preparations commenced. On 7 August, the Independent Election Commission launched an assessment to ensure that polling stations were optimally located in public buildings to serve all communities. With the assistance of the United Nations, on 14 August, the Commission submitted specifications for biometric voter registration technology to the National Procurement Authority, and on 17 August, the Authority initiated a limited tendering process for the technology. The reregistration of eligible Afghan voters with biometric technology would allow the Commission, for the first time, to compile polling station-specific voter lists.

13. Key political decisions for the elections remain pending. According to the Independent Election Commission road map, presented on 5 July, they included decisions on electoral constituencies, the use of technology for voter verification, polling and results management and funding modalities for the electoral process. Meanwhile, many parties and civil society organizations have expressed scepticism about the will and the capacity of the Government to organize credible elections, citing both security concerns and doubts about the independence of the Independent Election Commission.

14. No discernible progress has been made in fostering negotiations between the Government and the Taliban. The High Peace Council, under its new Chair, Karim Khalili, continued to revise its strategy and workplans within the overall framework of the President's vision for peace as outlined to international donors in April. UNAMA has continued its formal dialogue with the Taliban in an effort to seek a political solution to the continuing conflict. The Joint Executive Commission, responsible for the implementation of the peace agreement between the Government and Hizb-i Islami Gulbuddin, has been folded into the High Peace Council. As part of its efforts to support local-level peacebuilding, UNAMA facilitated three local peace initiatives covering six different provinces during the reporting period, including a dialogue between elders from two districts of Kandahar Province and a series of consultations with independent religious figures in Khost Province.

B. Security

15. The conflict continued unabated throughout the country. The United Nations recorded 5,532 security-related incidents from 15 June to 31 August 2017, representing an increase of 3 per cent compared with the same period in 2016. By the end of August 2017, the United Nations had recorded more than 16,290 security-related incidents for the first eight months of the year. The continuing high numbers are attributed mainly to armed clashes, which represent 64 per cent of the total security incidents and have increased by 5 per cent since 2016. The record level of armed clashes seen during 2017 reinforced the shift in the conflict evident since earlier in the year, away from asymmetric attacks towards a more traditional conflict pattern characterized by often prolonged armed clashes between government and anti-government forces. Asymmetric attacks, such as detonations of improvised explosive devices, suicide attacks, assassinations and abductions, decreased by 3 per cent compared with the same period in 2016 but remained the main cause of civilian casualties. The eastern region experienced the highest number of incidents, followed by the southern region.

16. The conflict has further evolved because of the Government's strategic decision, as a result of Taliban gains in rural areas, to focus its resources on defending population centres and disrupting the consolidation of Taliban control

over strategic areas. This change has led to an increasing number of clashes for control over lines of communication and vital infrastructure. In addition, the more secure hold of the Taliban over some rural areas has allowed them to undertake more frequent attacks in the north of Afghanistan.

17. The Taliban maintained their ability to contest territory across the country, compelling the Government to devote significant resources to maintain the status quo. In contrast with 2016, the Taliban have not launched any major attempts to capture a provincial capital since the announcement of their Operation Mansouri offensive in April. However, the Taliban were able to overrun and temporarily hold several district centres, including Taywara in the western province of Ghor, Kohistan and Ghormach in the northern province of Faryab and Jani Khel in the eastern province of Paktiya. The Afghan National Defence and Security Forces recaptured Taywara and Kohistan within a week, while control of Jani Khel changed three times during the reporting period. In the north-east, the Taliban put intense pressure on Qaramol, Dawlat Abad, Shirin Tagab and Khwajah Sabz Posh districts along the Maimana-Andkhoy highway in Faryab Province. In the south, the Taliban intensified their attacks on districts adjacent to the provincial capitals of Kandahar and Lashkar Gah, as well as on the Kabul-Kandahar highway. On 17 July, Afghan forces recaptured Nawah-ye Barakzai district in Helmand Province, which had been under Taliban control since October 2016.

18. The Government continued to implement its four-year plan on security sector reform, with the goals of increasing the capability of government forces, fighting corruption, improving security leadership and aligning operations with overall policy objectives, which was approved by presidential decree in May 2017. As part of the plan, the authority over the Afghan Border Police has been authorized for transfer from the Ministry of the Interior to the Ministry of Defence. On 20 August, the Special Forces of the Afghan National Army were elevated from division to corps level, which has as a target to double its personnel to 30,000 by the end of 2017. Nevertheless, the Government continued to face increasing challenges owing to the high levels of attrition in the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police as a result of casualties and desertion as well as difficulties in securing new recruits, in particular at the officer entry level.

19. While Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant-Khorasan Province (ISIL-KP) operations remain mostly limited to eastern Afghanistan, the group claimed responsibility for eight significant attacks nationwide during the reporting period. The group consolidated its presence in Kunar Province and succeeded in re-establishing operational capacity in areas of Nangarhar Province that previously had been cleared by Afghan security forces. Elsewhere, alleged ISIL-KP activities were reported in the northern provinces of Jowzjan and Sari Pul, as well as in the western provinces of Herat and Ghor, indicating that the group may have attracted affiliates in areas beyond its stronghold in the east.

20. Several high-profile security incidents during the reporting period led to a further deterioration of public confidence in the Government's security arrangements. The attack on a Shia mosque in Herat on 1 August killed over 90 people and drew widespread condemnation from both the Afghan public and the international community. The Taliban and self-proclaimed ISIL-KP affiliates launched an attack on the Mirza Olang area of Sayyad district in Sari Pul Province, leading to clashes from 3 to 5 August with local pro-government militia and allegations of mass killings of civilians. A subsequent investigation by UNAMA, including a fact-finding mission to the affected district, indicated that at least 36 people had been killed in the attack, many of them civilians or personnel hors de combat. As in Herat, the majority of the documented casualties were Shia. Another

attack on a Shia mosque occurred in Kabul on 25 August, killing 28 civilians, with ISIL-KP claiming responsibility.

21. At a summit of defence ministers of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), held in Brussels on 29 June, NATO allies and partners reaffirmed their commitment to Afghanistan until the end of 2020 and several allies announced increased troop contributions to the NATO Resolute Support Mission. However, troop deployment numbers remain significantly below the authorized levels. On 21 August, following the conclusion of a policy review by the United States of America on South Asia, the President of the United States, Donald Trump, announced a new strategy for Afghanistan and that United States troops would remain in Afghanistan in line with conditions on the ground.

22. Following the suicide attack near the diplomatic "Green Zone" in Kabul on 31 May, the Government upgraded security arrangements in the centre of the city. Several diplomatic missions had scaled down their staffing levels in the capital after the attack, leading to a significant overall decrease in the international footprint. UNAMA remained staffed at full capacity. During the reporting period, there were five incidents involving United Nations personnel, including three incidents of intimidation, one criminal case and one incident of abduction. On 13 August, two United Nations staff members who had been abducted on 8 June in Paktiya Province were released.

C. Regional cooperation

23. The bilateral relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan showed some signs of improved cooperation, as both countries took steps to improve relations. During a visit by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of China, Wang Yi, on 24 and 25 June, Afghanistan and Pakistan agreed to establish a crisis control mechanism for emergency communications, and, as a result, the three countries created a ministerial-level trilateral dialogue mechanism. On 2 July, Pakistan appointed a new Ambassador to Afghanistan, a post that had been vacant for several months. Following a visit by a senatorial delegation from the United States to Islamabad and Kabul from 2 to 4 July, Afghanistan and Pakistan agreed to conduct coordinated security operations against terrorist groups along the border, with monitoring and verification by the United States. On 15 August, the Foreign Secretary of Pakistan, Tehmina Janjua, visited Kabul on one of her first foreign trips, meeting with the President of Afghanistan to discuss ways of building mutual trust.

24. The Government continued its multilateral engagement through mechanisms such as the Heart of Asia — Istanbul Process. An expert meeting of the Process, on trade, commerce and investment opportunities, was held in Delhi from 6 to 8 August, with participants reaffirming their commitment to enhancing economic and connectivity cooperation. The Government focused increasingly on its relationship with the five Central Asian States, as the President made a number of visits to the region. The President visited Turkmenistan on 3 July, where he signed several bilateral transport agreements, and on 6 July he visited Dushanbe for a trilateral dialogue between Afghanistan, Pakistan and Tajikistan.

25. Negotiations restarted on a bilateral comprehensive strategic cooperation agreement between Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran, which is aimed at improving cooperation in the areas of security, the economy, refugees, culture and education. On 17 and 18 June, the first meeting of five technical committees was convened in Tehran. However, water remained an issue of contention between the two countries. On 3 July, at the International Conference on Combating Sand and Dust Storms, the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Hassan Rouhani, criticized the

construction of dams in Afghanistan. The remarks generated a public backlash in Afghanistan, with street demonstrations in the cities of Herat, Kabul, Kandahar and Jalalabad. The remarks were interpreted as undermining the right of Afghanistan to manage its own water resources. On 24 July, the National Security Adviser, Hanif Atmar, visited Tehran for consultations with his counterpart on counter-terrorism issues. On 5 August, President Ghani attended President Rouhani's inauguration ceremony in Tehran.

III. Human rights

26. On 17 July, UNAMA released its midyear report on the protection of civilians in armed conflict. Between 1 January and 30 June, the Mission documented 5,243 civilian casualties (1,662 deaths and 3,581 injured), on a par with civilian casualty figures documented in the same period in 2016. Conflict-related violence also destroyed livelihoods, homes and property, displaced thousands of families and restricted access to education, health and other services. UNAMA attributed 67 per cent of all civilian casualties to anti-government elements (43 per cent to the Taliban, 19 per cent to unidentified anti-government elements and 5 per cent to ISIL-KP), 18 per cent to pro-government forces (15 per cent to Afghan national security forces, 2 per cent to international military forces and 1 per cent to pro-government armed groups), 10 per cent to unattributed crossfire during ground engagements between anti-government elements and pro-government forces, 4 per cent to unattributed explosive remnants of war and 1 per cent to cross-border shelling.

27. The indiscriminate and unlawful use of combined improvised explosive device tactics by anti-government elements in civilian-populated areas, particularly suicide bombs and pressure-plate devices, accounted for 2,079 civilian casualties (596 deaths and 1,483 injured), or 40 per cent of all civilian casualties. Ground engagements between pro-government forces and anti-government elements were the second leading cause of civilian casualties (434 deaths and 1,375 injured). Women casualties increased by 23 per cent compared with the same period in 2016. The Mission documented 1,557 child casualties (436 deaths and 1,141 injured), accounting for 30 per cent of the total civilian casualties.

28. During the first six months of 2017, UNAMA documented 32 conflict-related incidents targeting or affecting access to health services or health-care workers, which resulted in 58 civilian casualties (27 deaths and 31 injured) and 18 civilian abductions. Most of the casualties occurred during the complex attack on the Sardar Mohammad Daud Khan Hospital in Kabul on 8 March. UNAMA documented a rise in attacks and incidents impacting education facilities and education-related personnel, with 24 incidents verified compared with 14 in the first quarter of 2017. Six incidents directly targeted girls' schools. During the second quarter of 2017, UNAMA documented seven incidents of denial of humanitarian access; all were attributed to armed opposition groups: six to the Taliban and one to ISIL-KP.

29. UNAMA verified the recruitment and use of 21 boys, including 15 by anti-government elements (11 by ISIL-KP, 3 by the Taliban, 6 by the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces and 1 by an unidentified armed group). The Mission received reports of up to 50 boys (10 verified to date) recruited by ISIL-KP who were undergoing religious and military training in Ghor Province. UNAMA continued sensitizing and training Afghan national security forces on the protection of children in armed conflict. On 27 August, UNAMA and the United Nations Children's Fund jointly conducted a one-day training session on child rights for 17 district chiefs of police in the city of Kabul.

30. Justice and redress for women remained low amid the continued prevalence of violence against women. The implementation of the national action plan on women, peace and security remained slow despite efforts that were focused on law reform and advocacy around violence against women and harassment and the strengthening of the prosecutor's office to address cases of violence against women. Of the revised estimated $83.0 million required for the implementation of the national action plan, $31.2 million is available, while the remaining amount has yet to be secured from donors. The prosecution units for the elimination of violence against women are now present in all 34 provinces, with 27 units staffed with at least one female prosecutor. The Ministry of the Interior continued efforts to enhance women's participation in the security sector, in particular their recruitment and promotion to leadership roles. With regard to women's participation in peace and reconciliation processes, six more women were introduced as members of the High Peace Council, bringing the total number to 13 out of 52 members.

31. On 16 August, the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission launched a national inquiry on the protection of the rights of victims of armed conflict and terrorism. UNAMA will provide technical support for the normative framework and the collection of data on civilian casualties. On 22 August, the Minister of Justice chaired an interministerial working group tasked with reviewing the recommendations made by the Committee against Torture in its concluding observations on the second periodic report of Afghanistan and preparing a follow-up report and plan of action for submission to the Committee in May 2018. Civil society actors continued to face intimidation and threats by anti-government elements and also experienced a lack of cooperation by local authorities in relation to those threats. UNAMA recorded one incident of intimidation of a human rights defender in Badghis Province and one incident of intimidation against a civil society actor in Herat Province. UNAMA also recorded one incident involving threats against a local journalist by anti-government elements in Farah Province. In July, civil society actors expressed concerns about the new draft law on gatherings, strikes and protests that sets conditions for the duration and organization of protests in certain areas and also maps out the authority of security forces in dealing with protests.

IV. Implementation of the Kabul process and coordination of development assistance

32. On 9 July, the National Unity Government convened the twentieth meeting of the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board in Kabul, co-chaired by my Special Representative and the Minister of Finance, Eklil Hakimi, with a focus on reform and development commitments ahead of a meeting of senior officials set for later in 2017. In the area of democratic, transparent and accountable government, ministerial speakers discussed election preparations, civil service reforms, subnational governance, judicial reforms, security, civil society engagement and anti-corruption. During a session on service delivery, speakers addressed the importance of institutional reforms and discussed the Government's commitments to delivering basic services to returnees and internally displaced populations. With regard to private sector growth and infrastructure, panellists identified measures to enhance the business environment and the Government committed to prioritizing private sector needs in the coming months.

33. In an effort to improve inclusivity, the Government took steps to engage civil society in development and reform processes. Under the Open Government Partnership, civil society representatives began work on a national action plan to promote good governance, anti-corruption and transparency. UNAMA facilitated the

participation of civil society at the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board meeting, where participants emphasized a greater role for civil society in monitoring mutual commitments by the Government and the international community. The national strategy on access to information, launched on 13 August, also called for civil society and the media to play a role in promoting public awareness of the right of citizens to access information and monitoring the implementation of the law on access to information.

34. Economic growth remained slow in the face of ongoing security and governance challenges. At a briefing on 11 July, the International Monetary Fund reported slight downward adjustments of economic growth estimates for 2017 and 2018, to 2.5 per cent and 3 per cent, respectively. However, the Fund does not expect the revisions to affect the Government's attainment of other quantitative targets, for which progress was reported to be on track. Despite persistently low growth, domestic revenue collection reportedly exceeded targets, although receipt of some operating grants from donors slowed. Key priorities in the Government's programme with the Fund will require parliamentary action in the coming months.

35. The Government continued to prioritize its anti-corruption efforts, in particular at the policy level. Between 22 June and 16 August, the National High Council for Rule of Law and Anti-Corruption convened four times, after remaining dormant for the first half of 2017. Chaired by the President, the Council adopted institutional reform plans for the Supreme Court, the Office of the Attorney General, the Ministry of Justice and the Afghan Independent Bar Association. In late August, the Government circulated its draft anti-corruption strategy, a commitment from the Brussels Conference on Afghanistan, held in October 2016, which was due to be adopted by June 2017. From 6 to 8 August, during a three-day joint conference on combating corruption in the defence and security sectors in Afghanistan, the Attorney General signed a memorandum of understanding with the Ministry of Defence, the National Directorate of Security and the Ministry of the Interior, aimed at developing joint mechanisms to combat corruption among the security institutions.

36. The Anti-Corruption Justice Centre has completed 21 cases at the trial and appellate levels against 86 accused. Outcomes include the conviction and sentencing to 20 years' imprisonment of a General for fuel fraud and stealing equipment. The security of Centre personnel remains an ongoing concern, and the presidential decree of 6 June, which obligated the Ministries of the Interior and Urban Development, the Office of the Attorney General and the National Directorate of Security to contribute to the protection of Centre personnel against security threats, has yet to be implemented.

37. With regard to local government accountability, on 30 July, the Government issued the Provincial Council Oversight Regulations, which lay out an enhanced role for the provincial councils in monitoring line departments and other government entities. The President agreed to improve coordination with the provincial councils by conducting regular regional meetings and inviting a representative of the councils to attend Cabinet meetings.

V. Humanitarian assistance

38. Civilians continued to bear the brunt of the ongoing conflict. Between mid-June and 15 August, more than 32,300 people were forced to flee their homes as a result of fighting, bringing the total number of displaced persons to more than 202,000 in 2017. Internal displacement has affected 30 of the 34 provinces, with Baghlan and Kunduz in the north, Nangarhar in the east and Uruzgan and Kandahar in the south experiencing the highest levels of displacement. While there was an

overall reduction in the number of people displaced compared with the same period in 2016, the deteriorating security situation has left many displaced communities in an increasingly precarious situation, with no immediate prospect of returning to their areas of origin. As at 31 August, the total funding for humanitarian action in Afghanistan stood at $235 million, of which $181 million was for activities included in the Humanitarian Response Plan.

39. Under the voluntary repatriation programme of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, more than 14,000 registered Afghan refugees who returned to Afghanistan during the reporting period were assisted. Over 98 per cent of them were returning from Pakistan. Returning individuals received an average of $200 per person to pay for transport and immediate humanitarian needs.

40. The deportation and spontaneous return of undocumented Afghans from Pakistan continued, with 15,567 arrivals (14,653 spontaneous arrivals and 914 deportees) between 15 June and 31 August, accounting for 19 per cent of the total arrivals from Pakistan in 2017. Since 1 January, the total number of undocumented returnees arriving from Pakistan rose to 83,505, down from 131,033 over the same period in 2016. During the reporting period, 86,906 arrivals from the Islamic Republic of Iran (29,044 spontaneous arrivals and 57,862 deportees) were documented. Of the total returnee population, the International Organization for Migration assisted 18,818 returnees (93 per cent) from Pakistan and 4,295 returnees (5 per cent) from the Islamic Republic of Iran during that period. Between 15 June and 31 August, the International Organization for Migration also assisted 479 returnees from Europe, compared with 995 for the same period in 2016. Separately, from mid-June to August, the World Food Programme provided assistance to 117,940 returnees and internally displaced persons who had been displaced as a result of conflict in various parts of the country, and joint Government-United Nations verification assessments are ongoing to identify additional internally displaced persons for assistance in the country.

41. From 15 June to 15 August, United Nations agencies and humanitarian partners provided 67,527 displaced people with assistance. Across the country, 2.2 million people of the planned 5.7 million received humanitarian assistance in all sectors from January to the end of June. However, constraints on humanitarian access continued to be recorded, with a total of 40 incidents affecting the United Nations and humanitarian partners registered during the reporting period and 214 since January. Three aid workers with Catholic Relief Services, a non-governmental organization, were killed and two injured in an attack on their vehicle in Ghor Province on 14 August. Since the start of 2017, 12 aid workers have been killed and as many injured. Health workers and health facilities continue to be heavily affected, with 26 incidents registered in the reporting period, bringing the total incidents so far in 2017 to 88. From June to August, dozens of health facilities were forced by armed groups to close down temporarily in Laghman Province, north of Kabul, and in the western provinces of Farah and Badghis in an attempt to coerce non-governmental organizations that are running the facilities to improve service delivery for their combatants. Overall in 2017, around half a million people are estimated to have at times been deprived of access to health care as a result of these tactics. Humanitarian partners continued to develop different modalities of delivering humanitarian assistance to communities in need, regardless of which party to the conflict is in control, and have increased sensitization efforts on humanitarian principles, notably neutrality and operational independence.

42. The polio eradication programme made significant progress, particularly in the northern province of Kunduz, where new importation from February 2017 was successfully contained. However, in the southern region, local transmission as a

result of frequent cross-border movement gave rise to five polio cases in Helmand, Kandahar and Zabul Provinces. Access for vaccinators in the southern region remains fragile, and in July, a ban on subnational immunization days vaccination campaigns in four districts of Kandahar resulted in 64,000 children remaining inaccessible, along with another 60,000 from the eastern, south-eastern and north-eastern regions.

43. The Mine Action Service of the United Nations continued with the transfer of responsibility for the management of the Mine Action Programme for Afghanistan to the Directorate of Mine Action Coordination and the Afghanistan National Disaster Management Authority. The Service will continue to support both institutions with capacity-building. The Mine Action Service and partners continued to provide risk education at encashment and transit centres to alert returnees to the danger posed by landmines, explosive remnants of war and abandoned pressure-plate improvised explosive devices. From 1 June to 31 July, 40,414 returnees received such education. In addition, mine action partners, coordinated by the Mine Action Service and the Directorate of Mine Action Coordination, declared 20 communities mine-free, which enabled approximately 20,000 individuals across 15.34 km^2 to move freely within their community. However, it is estimated that 3,378 minefields, 301 battlefields and 42 contaminated firing ranges remain, affecting 1,464 communities. The average monthly incident rate from January to June 2017 of 182 victims represents an increase compared with the monthly average of 164 victims recorded from January to June 2016; the vast majority (77 per cent) are due to explosive remnants of war and pressure-plate improvised explosive devices rather than landmines. As part of the Afghan Civilian Assistance Programme, the Mine Action Service assisted victims of large-scale improvised explosive attacks during the reporting period, including the vehicle-borne suicide attack of 31 May in Kabul, when some 550 families received immediate assistance packages.

VI. Counter-narcotics

44. From 1 June to 26 August, Afghan law enforcement authorities conducted a total of 629 counter-narcotics operations, which resulted in the seizure of 569 kg of heroin, 9,644 kg of morphine, 4,841 kg of opium, 25.4 kg of methamphetamine, 2,867 kg of hashish, 7,868 kg of solid precursor chemicals, 20,338 litres of liquid precursor chemicals and 722 K-tablets (synthetic drugs). In addition, three heroin processing laboratories were dismantled and 103 vehicles, 34 weapons and 177 mobile telephones were seized. During the counter-narcotics operations, a total of 708 suspects were arrested and one officer from the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces was wounded.

45. Regional cooperation on counter-narcotics continued during the reporting period, with a meeting on precursor cases held on 30 August in Almaty, Kazakhstan, within the framework of the Regional Intelligence Working Group on Precursors. At the meeting, four cases were reviewed, and backtracking investigations were launched at the regional level. The Ministry of Public Health, with the support of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, continued to work towards the national adoption of the international standards for the treatment of drug use disorders of the Office and the World Health Organization. As part of the process, the Ministry launched a pilot of a quality assurance mechanism aimed at improving the treatment of drug use disorders.

VII. Mission support

46. The Mission's vacancy rate as at 31 July 2017 was 11 per cent, compared with the approved vacancy rate of 14 per cent for international staff, and 4 per cent compared with the combined approved average vacancy rate of 7.5 per cent for national staff. Despite special measures granted for the Mission to recruit and retain more national female staff, their representation remains very low, notwithstanding an overall increase of 3 per cent from the previous reporting period. As at 31 July 2017, the female representation for each category of staff stood at: 30 per cent (international); 36 per cent (United Nations Volunteers); 8 per cent (National Professional Officers); and 7 per cent (Local level). Between 15 June and 15 August, UNAMA conducted 155 road and 13 air missions, as well as 417 reverse outreach missions during which district representatives visited UNAMA field offices.

47. The Mission began planning a reconfiguration of its structure and staffing to align its budget for 2018 with the recommendations made in my special report on the strategic review of UNAMA. Additionally, opportunities for co-location between UNAMA and United Nations system agencies, funds and programmes and improved cost recovery procedures continued to be explored. The Mission also continued to streamline support services, including medical and ground transportation services, as well as air assets.

VIII. Observations

48. I remain deeply concerned about the security situation in Afghanistan. Attacks in the western province of Herat, the northern province of Sari Pul, the southern province of Helmand and the capital, Kabul, which killed dozens of people and wounded many more, were a stark reminder of the heavy toll of the conflict on civilians in Afghanistan. Thousands of Afghans are still being displaced each month, losing their livelihoods and becoming separated from their communities as they flee from violence. While the people of Afghanistan continue to demonstrate immense courage and resilience in the face of adversity, their plight is a reminder, as always, that achieving lasting peace must be the primary goal towards which all efforts must be directed.

49. In this regard, I am also concerned by the lack of tangible progress towards a peace process, which remains the most urgent imperative facing Afghanistan. As I have stated in the past, the conflict has no military solution: peace can only be achieved through direct negotiations between the Government and the Taliban, which must form part of an inclusive, Afghan-led, Afghan-owned peace process. I call upon all parties to create an environment in which such dialogue is possible. Noting the critical importance of regional countries in order to move towards a peace process, the Government's continuing commitment to the Kabul Process for Peace and Security Cooperation and the interest shown by the partners of Afghanistan in continuing the initiative deserve support. For its part, following the mandated strategic review of UNAMA in 2017, the United Nations stands with renewed determination and with full respect for the sovereignty of Afghanistan to support the Afghan people in their quest for peace. Only through the committed engagement of all parties can an end to this long and costly conflict be achieved.

50. In a volatile security environment, the rise in sectarian attacks is particularly troubling. The terrorist attacks against Shia mosques in the city of Herat on 1 August and in Kabul on 25 August, which killed dozens of civilians as they prayed, were unconscionable acts of violence against a religious minority. Such attacks not only cause great human suffering, but risk escalating tensions between

religious communities. In the wake of such incidents, the expressions of solidarity from religious leaders in Afghanistan across sectarian lines are heartening and provide examples that other community members may follow. Now, more than ever, Afghanistan needs demonstrations of national solidarity in the face of common threats and cynical attempts to promote further divisions.

51. The announcement by the Independent Election Commission of a date for parliamentary and district council elections in July 2018 sets an important objective that can contribute to democratic consolidation in Afghanistan. While the timelines are ambitious, with concerted and sustained attention the election date remains achievable, and both the Commission and the Government have demonstrated a commitment to improving the credibility of the electoral process through the implementation of several key reforms. If implemented, the introduction of biometric voting cards and polling station-specific lists would constitute major improvements to the country's electoral system. Credible elections in 2018 will provide a channel for the peaceful expression of political opposition in an increasingly volatile political environment. I encourage the electoral institutions to broaden their outreach to all stakeholders to build public support for elections and the electoral reform process.

52. As elections become a more concrete reality, opposition groups have begun to intensify their political activity and, in many cases, have become increasingly vocal in their criticism of the Government. The emergence of new political alliances, along with the persistence of youth protest movements, are indications of the growing vibrancy of the still young democratic culture in Afghanistan. However, the inflammatory rhetoric of some political figures exacerbates social tensions and can undermine the fragile political consensus represented by the Constitution. If left unchecked, it may risk destabilizing the political system. I therefore stress the importance of responsible conduct by all stakeholders to ensure that political dissent continues to be expressed peacefully and within the framework of the country's constitutional and democratic processes.

53. Despite enormous challenges, the Government has made progress on its reform agenda, particularly in the realm of anti-corruption. A key component of this is the work of the Anti-Corruption Justice Centre, which, since its inception in late 2016, has become an important pillar in overall efforts to combat impunity. As demonstrated by recent convictions of high-level officials, the Centre is increasingly handling complex cases. I commend the Government for its continued prioritization of anti-corruption activities, which is a crucial element in its efforts to build credibility among the population. The Government has also continued its regular and constructive engagement with development partners, as demonstrated most recently at the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board meeting in July. For its part, the United Nations will redouble its donor coordination efforts, both to improve the coherence of its development activities and to ensure their alignment with the Government's own priorities and more effective delivery.

54. Record numbers of civilians continue to be killed and injured by indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks perpetrated by anti-government elements. Yet I also note with concern the significant increase in civilian casualties resulting from air strikes by pro-government forces. I remind all parties to the conflict of their responsibilities to protect civilians during military operations and stress the need for accountability for violations of international human rights and humanitarian law. In this regard, I encourage the Government to formally endorse the national policy on civilian casualty prevention and mitigation. I welcome the ratification by the Government of Afghanistan of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed

to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects and all the protocols thereto, including Protocol V, concerning explosive remnants of war.

55. As the Government considers how to implement the recommendations made by the Committee against Torture in its concluding observations on the second periodic review of Afghanistan, I encourage the Government to follow through on its public commitments both to ratify the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and to withdraw its reservations to the Convention, and all national institutions to enact effective measures of implementation in compliance with the Constitution of Afghanistan and international legal obligations.

56. Faced with significant challenges, the women of Afghanistan continue in their steadfast determination to achieve full and equal participation in public life. In this endeavour, the Government has proven itself to be a sincere and committed partner. The increased representation of women in the High Peace Council and the concerted efforts by the Government and its partners to address violence against women and girls are positive developments. I urge the Government to take concrete measures to strengthen the prosecution office and provincial units for the elimination of violence against women and the implementation of the national action plan on women, peace and security, including by allocating adequate resources, to ensure the effective provision of justice and redress for survivors and the participation of women in peace and reconciliation processes.

57. The reverberations of the suicide bombing of 31 May in Kabul continue to be felt, both by Afghans and their international partners. Following the attack, which was conducted in the city centre near the diplomatic enclave, many diplomatic missions scaled back their presence, with development staff numbers particularly affected. In this environment, the role of the United Nations on the ground has become even more crucial. I am grateful to the Government for its efforts to improve the security of the diplomatic community, which are being calibrated to enable UNAMA and the agencies, funds and programmes of the United Nations system to continue to operate at full capacity.

58. The implementation of the recommendations from my special report on the strategic review of UNAMA is under way, with the Mission looking to reconfigure its current posture. With reference to the reservations expressed by the Government, I wish to provide my personal assurance that the fundamental principles of Afghan national sovereignty, national leadership and national ownership, defining the work of the Mission, are unchanged. I would like to thank the Mission and its staff for its support to the review and convey my appreciation to the Government for its cooperation during the review.

59. I thank all United Nations personnel in Afghanistan and my Special Representative, Tadamichi Yamamoto, for their continued dedication to fulfilling our commitments in support of the people of Afghanistan under very challenging conditions.

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Report of the Secretary-General on South Sudan (covering the period from 2 June to 1 September 2017)

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 2327 (2016), by which the Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) until 15 December 2017 and requested me to report on the implementation of the mandate every 90 days. It covers political and security developments from 2 June to 1 September 2017, the humanitarian situation, and progress in the implementation of the Mission mandate. It also provides a review of progress made by the parties in ceasing hostilities, returning to the path of dialogue and achieving inclusiveness within the Government.

II. Political and economic developments

2. There has been minimal progress in the implementation of the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (the peace agreement). The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has been leading efforts to hold a high-level revitalization forum in what it sees as a final attempt to bring the peace process back on track. Meanwhile, various other initiatives are now under way which are also aimed at finding a political solution to the conflict, including the national dialogue and an initiative by the President of Uganda, Yoweri Museveni, to reunify factions of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM).

3. To date, however, these initiatives have yet to show tangible progress towards reducing the conflict or enhancing implementation of the peace agreement. The Government has prioritized efforts towards reconciliation through the national dialogue and has stated its intent to hold elections within the timeline outlined in the peace agreement. Opposition figures outside the country remain reluctant to engage in the national dialogue, arguing that the conditions are not ripe for genuine dialogue, and the modalities for including the opposition and "estranged groups" in the IGAD process are still being discussed. Meanwhile, the economic situation remains dire and continues to fuel public frustration, despite some Government efforts to put in place fiscal austerity measures.

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National political developments

4. On 9 July, in a message to the nation on the occasion of the sixth anniversary of independence, the President, Salva Kiir, emphasized his Government's efforts to promote peace and security, recalled his unilateral ceasefire declaration and issued a general amnesty. He stressed that the peace agreement and the ongoing national dialogue were the only way forward to attain peace. However, neither the ceasefire nor the peace agreement have been broadly respected or genuinely implemented.

5. The Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission convened plenary meetings on 12 July and 24 August. The Commission's six technical working committees submitted status reports on progress in implementing each of the peace agreement's thematic chapters to inform plenary discussions. In particular, committee members called on the Government to expedite the enactment of a bill providing amendments required to align the Transitional Constitution of 2011 with the peace agreement. The bill was submitted by the National Constitutional Amendment Committee to the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs on 13 April but is still under review. Meanwhile, the National Constitutional Amendment Committee started amending the relevant national security laws and conducted preliminary consultations on revisions to the Political Parties Act and the National Elections Act of 2012.

6. On 17 July, President Kiir replaced six members of the Transitional National Legislative Assembly linked to SPLM in Opposition under the former First Vice-President, Riek Machar, with new appointees allied to the faction of the First Vice-President Taban Deng Gai, further consolidating the latter's presence in the Government. On 14 and 27 July, Riek Machar announced the appointment of new governors for 9 of the 21 federal states that his faction has proposed.

7. The National Dialogue Steering Committee conducted plenary meetings from 29 May to 22 June. On 8 June, the plenary created 15 subcommittees to conduct thematic and local-level consultations. Two special delegations reached out to opposition leaders residing outside the country, including in Khartoum and Nairobi. The Steering Committee Co-Chair led a special delegation to reach out to Riek Machar on 28 June in South Africa, but they were unable to meet with him. Delegations also travelled to Khartoum, Addis Ababa and Nairobi to continue their outreach. From 3 to 28 July, the Steering Committee conducted a seminar on international lessons learned in managing dialogues for its members, with technical support provided by the United Nations and other partners. On 28 July, the Steering Committee announced preparations to commence subnational consultations in September.

8. On 15 June, the members of the voluntary civil society task force on the implementation of the peace agreement issued a common position on the national dialogue process in which they expressed concern that the process could be compromised by limitations to the freedom of expression, the non-participation of opposition groups, continuing hostilities, the composition and partiality of the Steering Committee, failure to release political detainees, and lack of confidence in the parties to the conflict. The task force called for the national dialogue to focus on national concerns, such as vision, identity and unity, security sector and economic reforms, historical grievances, distribution of natural resources, and governance.

9. Given the continuing lack of women's participation in the peace process, on 29 June a civil society group named the South Sudan Women's Monthly Forum issued a gender gap analysis of the implementation of the peace agreement. It highlighted the fact that the 25 per cent quota for women's participation in the executive had not been met and recommended that more women be appointed to key government positions.

Regional engagement

10. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development held its thirty-first extraordinary summit on South Sudan on 12 June in Ethiopia and resolved to convene a high-level revitalization forum of the parties to the peace agreement, including estranged groups, to restore a permanent ceasefire and implement the peace agreement. On 23 and 24 July, the IGAD Council of Ministers, at its meeting in Juba, noted the positive response of the Government to the establishment of the forum and welcomed the commitment by President Kiir to collaborate and implement the decisions of the 12 June summit. On 16 and 17 August, IGAD convened a meeting of experts in Ethiopia to provide an opportunity for independent South Sudanese who will not formally participate in the forum to make recommendations for the revitalization process.

11. On 16 June and 20 and 27 July, the President of Uganda facilitated three meetings between SPLM factions in Uganda in the context of the implementation of the 2015 Arusha Agreement on the reunification of SPLM. The pro-Taban Deng faction of SPLM in Opposition was present. SPLM in Opposition led by Riek Machar was invited to send representatives to the meetings, but declined the offer. On 27 July, SPLM in Government, the SPLM faction led by First Vice-President Taban Deng Gai, and a faction of the former detainees led by Rebecca Nyandeng Garang signed a declaration resolving to establish a working group to operationalize the implementation of the Arusha Agreement, and called upon Riek Machar and other SPLM factions to join the reunification process. On 27 July, the pro-Machar faction criticized the talks in Uganda as a "mockery" of the SPLM reunification process.

12. The African Union High Representative for South Sudan, the former President of Mali, Alpha Oumar Konaré, visited Juba twice, from 22 to 25 June and from 27 August to 1 September. During the visits, he met senior government officials, including President Kiir, key officials involved with the national dialogue, members of the diplomatic community, and UNMISS to discuss the overall situation in South Sudan and the African Union's contribution to restoring peace and stability in the country.

Other political developments

13. On 11 July, the Speaker of the Transitional National Legislative Assembly appointed new leaders for the 25 standing committees of the Assembly, of which seven committee Chairs and eight Deputy Chairs are women. Seventeen Chairs and 17 Deputy Chairs were allocated to SPLM in Government, six Chairs and six Deputy Chairs to the pro-Taban Deng SPLM in Opposition, one Chair and two Deputy Chairs to the other political parties and one Chair to the SPLM leaders. The appointments resolved a prolonged impasse in the Assembly following disputed changes to the committee leadership made by the Speaker in March, which had largely paralysed parliamentary affairs for three months.

14. In response to the ongoing judicial strike called by the General Assembly of Justices and Judges in May, on 12 July, President Kiir removed 14 judges from office, invoking a constitutional provision that allows for the removal of judges for "misconduct" and other grounds based on the recommendation of the National Judicial Service Commission. Striking judges demanded adequate financial and logistical support to the judiciary, salary increment, and the resignation of the Chief Justice. A government committee established by President Kiir in April to look into the judges' grievances submitted its findings to the President in June, rejecting all demands.

Economic developments

15. South Sudan continues to face serious economic challenges. Government revenue remains limited, owing mainly to relatively low oil prices and low net oil production, currently at around 118,000 barrels per day, whereas it stood at 130,000 barrels per day in the previous quarter. Inflation and persistent salary backlogs have further weakened household purchasing power, compounded by the weakening of the South Sudanese pound against the United States dollar. The annual consumer price index increased 154.6 per cent from July 2016 to July 2017, mainly driven by high food prices. Agricultural production continues to be hampered by insecurity and displacement, particularly in the greater Equatoria region. On 28 August, Parliament adopted the national budget for the fiscal year 2017/18; it totals SSP 46.487 billion with amendments, which exceeds available resources by SSP 16.8 billion. During the deliberations, parliamentarians discussed the country's economic outlook, the lifting of the fuel subsidy, adjustment of tax rates and other sources of revenue. The Minister of Finance, Planning and Economic Development announced the formation of a secretariat to spearhead the process of designing and executing a three-year national development strategy aimed at stabilizing the economy.

III. Security situation

16. Despite the unilateral ceasefire declared by President Kiir in May and calls for all armed groups to respect the cessation of hostilities agreement, the security situation did not improve during the reporting period, and almost all areas of the country were affected by the conflict. Military operations continued in parts of greater Upper Nile and some areas of the Equatorias, while tensions persisted in the greater Bahr el-Ghazal region. On 29 August, the Minister of Defence was cited in local media warning that the general amnesty announced by the President was not "open ended" and on 31 August, in an interview with UNMISS Radio Miraya, he confirmed his official directives to grant rebel forces a 30-day ultimatum to declare their willingness to consider ceasefire arrangements or else face Government attacks.

Greater Upper Nile region

17. The security situation in greater Upper Nile remained volatile, with clashes between the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and the pro-Machar SPLA in Opposition in Renk County, on 7 and 14 June in Babounge and Atham villages and on 5 July in Gostabun. In Manyo County, the SPLA and opposition forces clashed in Kola and Kuek towns on 13 June and in Kaka on 18, 20 and 26 July. SPLA operations to push further into opposition-held areas continued, with clashes between SPLA and SPLA in Opposition forces on 29 June in Mathiang causing civilian displacement. On 6 and 7 July, 25 humanitarian workers were relocated from Pagak because of insecurity in the area. Clashes continued as SPLA forces arrived in Maiwut and, on 8 August, both SPLA and the pro-Machar SPLA in Opposition confirmed to UNMISS that SPLA had captured Pagak on 6 August. However, the opposition reportedly managed to regain control over parts of Pagak on 10 August. Both sides remain present in the area of Pagak and both have since claimed to be in control of Pagak.

18. The security situation in Unity was tense, with reports of localized conflict and insecurity. UNMISS continued to receive reports of forced recruitment by the pro-Taban Deng SPLA in Opposition in Guit County, including attempts to forcibly recruit national humanitarian workers. On 22 June, SPLA and pro-Machar SPLA in

Opposition forces exchanged gunfire in Gear, Leer County. In Kuerguini, Guit County, UNMISS observed a military parade of the pro-Taban Deng SPLA in Opposition on 4 July, during which the Deputy Minister of Defence and Veteran Affairs highlighted the Government's plan to reintegrate pro-Taban Deng SPLA in Opposition forces into SPLA. The SPLA Division IV Commander also reported the withdrawal of SPLA forces from Pilling, Leer County. Clashes between SPLA and pro-Machar SPLA in Opposition forces continued in Leer County, however.

19. In Jonglei, the security situation remained unstable. The SPLA Brigade Commander in Pibor reported that most of the SPLA soldiers stationed in Rate, Pochala County, had abandoned their barracks, owing to lack of food and salary arrears. On 13 June, SPLA soldiers denied a United Nations agency aircraft permission to take off from the Pochala airfield, citing grievances over the non-payment of salaries, and temporarily held the aircraft, crew and passengers, who were released on 14 June. The pro-Machar SPLA in Opposition Commander in Lankien claimed that, on 10 July, Government forces in Waat attacked Walgak in Akobo County but were reportedly pushed back by opposition forces.

Greater Equatoria region

20. The security situation in some areas of the Equatorias was tense, with reports of clashes between the SPLA and opposition forces, as well as the killing of civilians and ambushes along major roadways. In Eastern Equatoria, the situation was particularly tense around Torit, with confrontations between SPLA and the pro-Machar SPLA in Opposition. On 8 June, a convoy of vehicles escorted by SPLA was ambushed, leading to the deaths of at least 18 civilians, including seven women, and SPLA soldiers. The pro-Machar SPLA in Opposition reportedly claimed responsibility for the attack. On 13 June, armed men reportedly fired upon the vehicle of the Governor of Imatong on the Torit-Katire road. The following day, SPLA conducted a military operation against pro-Machar SPLA in Opposition elements south of Torit, reportedly causing civilian casualties. Further clashes were reported on 20 June.

21. In Central Equatoria, there were continued reports of clashes between the SPLA and opposition forces. On 29 June, a pro-Machar SPLA in Opposition official claimed that SPLA forces from Kaia clashed with opposition forces in Yoldu, Morobo County, resulting in civilian casualties. Insecurity along the roads also continued. On 7 June, armed men reportedly opened fire on a non-governmental organization vehicle along the Yei-Lainya road, injuring one person. On 10 June, three persons were killed and two others injured when armed men ambushed two commercial vehicles between Kenyi and Loka. On 13 June, an officer of the National Police Service was reportedly killed in an ambush on the Terakeka-Mingkaman road. Armed violence has continued to hamper free movement on the principal arteries connecting Juba to Bor and Juba to Pibor. On 26 August, an American journalist reportedly embedded with pro-Machar SPLA in Opposition forces was killed in clashes with SPLA in Kaia, Central Equatoria. Both sides have accused the other of initiating the fighting.

22. In Western Equatoria, localized insecurity continued, while the government of Gbudwe continued its efforts to integrate surrendered armed elements. On 2 June, local authorities reported that an armed group attacked the local police station in Yeri Payam, Mvolo County. On 13 June, two officers of the National Police Service were reportedly killed and two others injured when armed men attacked the police station in Maridi. There were also localized tensions in Yambio County, with reports of incidents at an internally displaced person camp in Bangasu and tensions between the Azande and Jur-Beri communities. On 29 June, one person was reportedly killed and two persons were abducted when armed men attacked members of the Jur-Beri

tribe in the area. On 3 July, six houses of members of the Azande community were burned in Yambio County, along the Bazungua road.

Greater Bahr el-Ghazal region

23. The security situation in greater Bahr el-Ghazal was also tense, with reports of intermittent clashes and security incidents involving Government forces and armed groups. Tensions continued between SPLA and opposition elements south of Wau. On 15 June, SPLA claimed to UNMISS that clashes had occurred between SPLA and opposition elements in the Bazia area. According to some civilians, SPLA clashed with the pro-Machar SPLA in Opposition in the Bagari area on 20 June. In Boro Medina in Western Bahr el-Ghazal, there were clashes between SPLA and pro-Machar SPLA in Opposition forces on 5 and 6 July, resulting in at least 17 casualties on both sides, and SPLA subsequently claimed to have regained control of Boro Medina. In Northern Bahr el-Ghazal, SPLA clashed with an armed group near Aweil East and the border with the Sudan, on 12 June. UNMISS conducted a patrol to Baac County to follow up on alleged attacks on SPLA positions in Adol Payam on 28 June. County officials claimed that Misseriya nomads from the Sudan carried out the attack, resulting in civilian casualties.

24. In Lakes, several security incidents were reported. The Rumbek County Commissioner reportedly sustained minor injuries in an ambush in Rumbek Centre County on 14 June. In Rumbek East County, armed men reportedly robbed a senior SPLA member and three bodyguards along the road to Aduel Payam, Rumbek East County. Meanwhile, organized forces conducted forced disarmament in Rumbek town on 28 June. According to an official of Western Lakes, the disarmament process would be extended to cattle camps there.

Intercommunal conflict

25. In parallel to the broader national conflict, intercommunal tensions also affected the security environment in different areas of the country. Tensions between the Bor Dinka and Murle communities continued in Jonglei, despite a cessation of hostilities signed in May. On 15 July, Kolmerek was attacked by members of the Murle community, which left at least 31 persons killed, 20 injured, several children abducted and reportedly 7,000 cattle stolen. The violence produced significant levels of destruction, including the burning of several homes. An investigative commission established by First Vice-President Taban Deng Gai has yet to publish its findings.

26. In greater Bahr el-Ghazal, cycles of intercommunal violence escalated in June and July between the Apuk and Aguok communities of Gogrial and spilled over to parts of neighbouring Tonj, Wau and Aweil East. As a consequence, President Kiir on 17 July declared a three-month state of emergency in Gogrial and in some parts of Tonj, Wau and Aweil East. On 23 July, in Lakes, intercommunal violence among the Dinka subclans resulted in 19 civilian casualties.

IV. Humanitarian situation

27. Conflict and hunger continued to drive displacement: more than 3.9 million South Sudanese have been forced to flee their homes, and 1.9 million internally displaced persons and over 2 million refugees have been hosted by the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, the Sudan and Uganda. As at 18 August, Uganda alone hosted more than 1 million South Sudanese refugees, the majority of them women and children. According to the revised inter-agency refugee response plan for South Sudan, led by the Office of

the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the South Sudan refugee crisis has become the fastest growing refugee situation in the world.

28. Humanitarian needs continued to rise because of the impact of armed conflict, deteriorating economic conditions, disease, intercommunal violence and displacement in many parts of the country. Food insecurity reached unprecedented levels in South Sudan in June, and an estimated 6 million people (50 per cent of the population) were severely food insecure in June and July, including 1.7 million on the brink of famine. Although the mobilization of a large-scale multisectoral humanitarian response was able to halt the localized famine declared in February in Leer and Mayendit in Unity, 45,000 people were estimated to be facing catastrophic food insecurity (famine) in Koch, Leer and Mayendit Counties in Unity and also in Ayod County, Jonglei.

29. The population continues to be more susceptible to disease owing to the ongoing conflict and crisis. As the malaria season peaks, more than 1.3 million cases and nearly 2,500 related deaths have been reported since January 2017. Since June 2016, South Sudan has experienced the deadliest cholera outbreak since its independence. Cumulatively, 19,851 cholera cases, including 355 deaths (a case fatality rate of 1.8 per cent), were reported in 26 counties across South Sudan as at 13 August. An estimated 1,024 cases of measles, with 24 deaths, have been reported, mostly affecting children under 5.

30. In June and July, the numbers of reported incidents of humanitarian access restrictions were the highest in 2017, totalling 100 and 136 cases, respectively. Partners reported a substantial rise in incidents involving violence against personnel and assets, with 46 cases in June and 49 in July compared to 29 cases in May. Insecurity also disrupted aid operations and forced the relocation of at least 70 humanitarian workers from areas of Upper Nile, Unity, Jonglei, Eastern Equatoria and Western Bahr el-Ghazal. Violence against aid workers and assets included break-ins, looting of humanitarian supplies and other assets and physical assault. At least 18 humanitarian compounds (offices, residences and warehouses) were broken into countrywide in June and July, resulting in the looting of humanitarian supplies, including more than 670 tons of food items. On 27 August, two United Nations Volunteers who had been detained for more than one week by opposition forces were released in Central Equatoria.

31. Despite the increasingly hostile operating environment, humanitarians scaled up their response through intensive negotiations and sustained advocacy regarding the need for free, safe and unhindered humanitarian access. In 2017, more than 3.8 million people have been reached so far with humanitarian and protection assistance. This includes 2.5 million people who received food assistance, more than 1 million people who accessed improved water sources, more than 100,000 children under 5 treated for severe malnutrition and 1,629,653 children between 6 and 9 months vaccinated against measles.

32. Funding shortfalls remained a challenge: the Humanitarian Response Plan for 2017 is just 65 per cent funded, leaving a gap of $578 million.

V. Implementation of the Mission's mandated tasks

A. Protection of civilians

33. UNMISS continued to follow a three-tiered approach to the protection of civilians. Under the first tier, protection through dialogue and political engagement, my Special Representative exercised his good offices to engage national and local

authorities, and senior military officials. In those engagements, he stressed the Government's responsibility to protect civilians and the need for the parties to cease hostilities and ensure unhindered access for UNMISS and humanitarian actors. UNMISS also conducted 28 workshops at the subnational level on conflict management, reconciliation and social cohesion through which 1,658 participants were reached, some from UNMISS protection of civilians sites, including local government representatives, traditional leaders, youth and women.

34. In Kuacjok, UNMISS facilitated a local leadership dialogue to help to mitigate recurrent communal violence between the Apuk and Aguok communities in Gogrial. In Rumbek, UNMISS supported a follow-up conference to foster peaceful cross-border pastoral migration between Amadi, Gok, Eastern Lakes, Western Lakes and Terakeka from 14 to 18 August. In Yambio, UNMISS in collaboration with Gbudwe authorities implemented a series of community dialogues to ease tensions between the various ethnic groups.

35. Under the second tier, protection of civilians under threat of physical violence, as at 29 August, the Mission protected 212,969 internally displaced persons in six UNMISS protection of civilians sites. This includes 114,683 in Bentiu, 38,448 in Juba, 24,402 in Malakal, 651 in Melut, 1,940 in Bor and 32,845 in Wau. A temporary protection area in Leer, southern Unity, also continued to offer refuge to more than 1,000 displaced persons. A total of 614 persons suspected of having committed serious security incidents within the sites were detained in the UNMISS holding facilities in Juba, Malakal and Bentiu from January to July 2017. In order to reinforce the civilian character of the sites, UNMISS conducted sensitization campaigns in Bentiu, Malakal and Wau on relevant site regulations. On 28 July, 22 opposition soldiers breached the perimeter of the UNMISS Bentiu protection site. UNMISS subsequently met with the leaders of the displaced persons to ensure that the soldiers were escorted out of the protection site. Peacekeepers in Bentiu have also continued to intervene to prevent attempts at forced recruitment of civilians by armed groups immediately outside the sites; most recently, they rescued three abducted youths on 23 August.

36. UNMISS continued to focus on pre-empting, deterring and mitigating violence against civilians in areas beyond UNMISS protection of civilians sites. Efforts included continued proactive deployment and patrolling, including dismounted integrated patrols comprising military, police and civilian personnel to facilitate engagement with host communities and displaced persons. During the reporting period, 6,853 patrols were conducted. UNMISS continued regular patrols outside the protection of civilians sites in Juba, Bentiu, Bor, Malakal and Wau. Despite the poor condition of the roads during the rainy season, UNMISS undertook significant outreach activities to the conflict-affected areas of Kajo-keji and Yei in Central Equatoria, Magwe in Eastern Equatoria, Raja and Deim Zubeir in Western Bahr el-Ghazal, Mayendit in Unity, Manyabol, Pochala and Jalle in Jonglei, and Kodok, Tonga and Aburoc in Upper Nile. UNMISS conducted a series of mounted patrols along the Juba-Nimule road in Central Equatoria in order to improve the security situation along the route. In July, UNMISS swiftly reinforced its base in Torit, Eastern Equatoria, in response to heightened insecurity.

37. In order to address incidents of conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence against displaced women and girls, UNMISS enhanced integrated and active patrolling in areas where women and girls were most at risk. In the protection of civilians sites in Bor and Bentiu, sensitization campaigns reminded women to adhere to the firewood patrols to avoid sexual assaults. The United Nations team supported the SPLA Taskforce on Sexual Violence in developing an action plan on sexual violence crime prevention and response. UNMISS also organized events in

the protection of civilians sites in Juba on prevention of sexual violence with 400 participants, 305 women and 95 men.

38. Under the third tier, establishment of a protective environment, UNMISS continued to engage with national and local authorities and civil society to create a more conducive environment for combating impunity for abuses and violations of human rights and international humanitarian law by all parties to the conflict. In Bor and Malakal, UNMISS organized a series of workshops to hear views of representatives of women and youth on the minimum conditions for return and reintegration. In response to the interest in return expressed by displaced persons in Melut, UNMISS and humanitarian partners conducted consultations to explore possible solutions. In Wau, UNMISS engaged with local authorities to promote a protective environment outside the protection site that would allow displaced populations to return to their areas of origin.

39. Within the framework of the Global Open Days on Women, Peace and Security, UNMISS, with United Nations agencies, organized a national conference at which 136 women deliberated on key areas such as peace and security and participation of women in conflict resolution. UNMISS also continued to host sensitization workshops for community members and local and national actors on gender equality and sexual and gender-based violence, including conflict-related sexual violence. UNMISS drew attention to the linkage between dowry and gender-based violence in addition to sensitizing members of the SPLM Youth League on the Mission's mandate and work on gender equality, women's empowerment and ending violence against women and girls.

40. UNMISS enhanced its communications outreach through multimedia content production. Radio Miraya added 10 hours of weekly programming focused on promoting dialogue and peace initiatives and combating hate speech.

B. Monitoring and investigating human rights

41. The human rights environment in South Sudan remained fragile, primarily because of the ongoing conflict in various parts of the country. Conflict-related violence continued, including a high level of sexual violence, as well as extrajudicial killings, arbitrary detention and ill-treatment, road ambushes, and intercommunal violence. During the reporting period, UNMISS recorded the killing of 110 civilians, including 39 women, and the wounding of 45 others, although the actual number of casualties is likely to be much higher. The Mission's ability to monitor and verify alleged human rights violations and abuses, including sexual violence by militias, armed youth and elements of security forces, is greatly hampered by the continued insecurity and restrictions of movement to locations of alleged violations and of access to state institutions, including places of detention.

42. Allegations of human rights violations continued to be made mainly against SPLA and in some instances against armed opposition groups, including SPLM/A in Opposition. For instance, of the 26 cases of conflict-related sexual violence documented in June and July, 11 were attributed to SPLA and pro-Government forces, and 7 to SPLA in Opposition and its affiliated groups, the rest being attributed to unidentified perpetrators. In Wau, Western Bahr el-Ghazal, UNMISS received information that, in order to avoid detaining suspects, police increasingly mediate minor criminal cases, thereby excluding the possibility of judicial review. On 27 June, two young men previously sentenced to death, and believed to be minors at the time of the committed crime, were executed in Juba, raising concerns about the continuing implementation of the death sentence in South Sudan, despite the stated moratorium on the death penalty. Physical conditions in many detention

centres and prisons remained poor, and cases of prolonged, arbitrary and proxy detention were common across the country.

43. The Special Tribunal formed by the General Court Martial held hearings, which started on 30 May, for the trial of 12 SPLA soldiers accused of committing crimes and human rights violations, including rape, murder, damage to property and theft, on 11 July 2016 at the Terrain Hotel compound in Juba. On 9 August, the Special Tribunal granted the prosecutor's application to allow victims unwilling or unable to travel to South Sudan to provide statements via videoconference. The court has also allowed the use of closed sessions to protect the identities of witnesses. Observers, including UNMISS, remain concerned about other aspects of the hearings, however, and are monitoring the proceedings to assess compliance with national and international human rights standards, including the right of victims to an effective remedy, the right to fair trial and respect for due process of the accused.

44. A challenging environment persists for media workers in South Sudan. On 7 June, the Media Authority publically disclosed that it had declined to accredit 20 foreign journalists for reportedly producing unsubstantiated reports or allegedly inciting hate. On 10 July, the National Security Services arrested the television Director of the South Sudan Broadcasting Corporation for allegedly having failed to provide live coverage of President Kiir's speech on the anniversary of independence. Released on 19 July, the Director was subsequently dismissed from his position. On 17 July, the South Sudan National Communication Authority blocked the websites of four news outlets for reportedly disseminating messages perceived as hostile by the Government. The decision was condemned by several civil society activists, and by national and international media organizations.

45. Incidents involving hate speech continued to threaten and incite violence. On 28 June and 4 July, the Bor Community Youth Association sent letters to a United Nations agency based in Bor, Jonglei, warning Equatorians working for non-governmental organizations and United Nations agencies to immediately leave Bor or face consequences. In response, on 4 July, a document purporting to be a press release originating from the United States of Equatoria in the Republic of South Sudan characterized the threats as a declaration of war against Equatorians and urged displaced Bor Dinka within the Equatorias to leave. Condemnation by national authorities and civil society groups contributed to defuse tensions. In connection with the letters, 16 individuals were arrested and subsequently released. On 20 June, the Media Authority released a memorandum prompting media organizations to avoid the dissemination of statements that threaten, insult, ridicule and abuse the identity of a tribe or community and to avoid using derogatory words that have the potential to incite violence. Through regular engagements with authorities, civil society and journalists, UNMISS continued to promote greater understanding of permissible restrictions to freedom of expression so that the curbing of hate speech is not used as a pretext to deter political activism and suppress dissenting voices.

46. During the reporting period, 103 incidents of grave violations against children were reported. Of those, 61 incidents affecting 3,015 children (1,382 boys, 933 girls and 700 whose sex is unknown) were verified. These included incidents of killing and maiming, recruitment and use of children, and attacks on schools and hospitals. To date, 45 schools (37 verified and 8 unverified) remain occupied and are being used for military purposes. The United Nations continues to advocate at different levels for the armed actors to vacate the schools. In August 2017, as a result of the engagement of the country task force on monitoring and reporting with the Taban Deng faction of SPLA in Opposition in Jonglei, the United Nations and the National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission verified reports of

recruitment and use of 313 boys associated with SPLM/A in Opposition aligned with Taban Deng Gai in Pibor, Jonglei. As part of its child protection mainstreaming, UNMISS conducted 36 training sessions on child protection for 1,374 participants (833 UNMISS personnel, 425 SPLA members, and 116 SPLA in Opposition members).

C. Creating the conditions conducive to the delivery of humanitarian assistance

47. UNMISS continues to provide force protection for food delivery, convoys and other humanitarian activities. Patrols aimed at accessing areas where violence, displacement and human rights violations had been reported and where humanitarians were providing services continued to face frequent obstructions, however, despite continued actions by UNMISS to persist through roadblocks and other restrictions.

48. In response to heavy gunfire approximately 18 km from Bunj town on 6 and 11 July, an UNMISS quick reaction force was dispatched, and relocated 18 non-governmental organization staff to the UNMISS base. Also on 11 July, UNMISS relocated 13 humanitarian workers because of an exchange of fire between an armed group and SPLA soldiers near the UNMISS temporary operating base in Leer. In Pibor, UNMISS evacuated 13 members of a non-governmental organization from their compound when it was attacked on 12 July.

49. The United Nations Mine Action Service deployed 33 mine action teams to survey and clear roads, airstrips and helicopter landing sites to enable security and humanitarian access. During the reporting period, 1,345,612 m^2 were surveyed and released; a further 5,377 explosive hazards and 33,963 rounds of small arms ammunition were removed and destroyed. In Aburoc, Upper Nile, the Service conducted mine action awareness campaigns and surveyed over 30 km of road to facilitate movement by UNMISS and humanitarian actors to respond to the immediate needs of internally displaced persons.

D. Supporting the implementation of the peace agreement

50. UNMISS continued to host regular forums for international partners and the "Friends of South Sudan" group to support the work of the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission and align the positions of the international community prior to the Commission's plenary meetings. My Special Representative also continued to exercise his good offices to advocate for implementation of the peace agreement, including through regular meetings with the President and other national leaders in Juba, and in the field through regular interactions with state and local leadership.

51. UNMISS supported the operations of the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism by providing force protection and logistical and administrative assistance to the Mechanism's monitoring and verification teams during their field visits to critical areas. UNMISS also provided support for the establishment of new monitoring and verification team sites at Bunj and Renk, raising the number of sites in South Sudan to 16. UNMISS is also monitoring progress towards the establishment of cantonment sites by participating in regular meetings of the Joint Military Ceasefire Commission and, on 15 June, the United Nations Mine Action Service completed the survey and clearance of the cantonment site in Juba identified by the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission.

52. In support of the establishment of the Joint Integrated Police, UNMISS continued to work with the Joint Management Team comprising officers from the South Sudan National Police Service and the SPLM/A in Opposition faction led by First Vice-President Taban Deng Gai. On 17 June, 1,230 of the 1,253 Joint Integrated Police recruits designated by the ministerial order graduated at a ceremony presided over by President Kiir. Of the 1,230 graduated recruits, 917 successfully completed the training supported by the United Nations police, and 336 are currently undergoing remedial training.

53. On 20 and 21 July in Juba, almost two years after the Hybrid Court was first mandated, a delegation from the African Union Commission held the first meeting with the Government concerning its establishment. The Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs and United Nations Legal Counsel participated in the meeting at the invitation of the Acting Legal Counsel of the African Union Commission. The African Union Commission delegation and the Government agreed on a joint road map for the establishment of the Hybrid Court for South Sudan. A follow-up meeting was held from 8 to 11 August in Addis Ababa, during which representatives of the Government and the Office of the Legal Counsel of the African Union Commission discussed and agreed, at the technical level, the content of the legal instruments for the establishment of the Hybrid Court. The Office of Legal Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat provided technical assistance during the meeting. The legal instruments will now be submitted for internal review and approval within the Government and the African Union Commission.

VI. Mission staffing and status of deployment

54. As at 29 August, the strength of UNMISS civilian personnel stood at 2,621, comprising 861 international staff members (including 223 female members representing 26 per cent), 1,372 national staff members (including 193 female staff members representing 14 per cent) and 388 United Nations Volunteers (including 121 female volunteers representing 31 per cent).

55. The police strength as at 29 August stood at 1,672 of the authorized 2,101 officers, including 614 individual police officers (with 107 female officers representing 17 per cent), 986 personnel in formed police units (with 127 female officers representing 13 per cent) and 72 corrections officers (with 20 female officers representing 28 per cent). The arrival of a Ghanaian formed police unit of 170 officers in Wau and the deployment of the all-female Rwandan formed police unit in Juba is expected in October/November.

56. The UNMISS troop strength stood at 12,817 military personnel, including 186 military liaison officers (with 8 female officers representing 4 per cent), 378 military staff officers (with 28 female officers representing 7 per cent) and 12,253 military contingent personnel (with 411 female officers representing 3 per cent). The 378-strong contingent of military engineers and medical staff from the United Kingdom completed its deployment in June. Following the arrival late in February of a 255-strong advance party of the incoming Bangladeshi infantry battalion in Wau, the main body of a 595-strong Bangladeshi battalion is now in the Mission. It is expected that a 200-strong Ghanaian contingent will be deployed to Aweil in October.

57. The regional protection force continued its deployment to South Sudan, which will proceed gradually over the coming months. The Bangladesh construction engineering company and the Nepalese high-readiness company are now in the Mission area, and an advance company of the Rwandan battalion arrived on 5 August. As the planning for the full deployment of the regional protection force

progresses, critical issues and decisions have yet to be resolved, including continued government resistance to the force's mandated role to support the protection of Juba International Airport.

58. UNMISS has intensified efforts to raise awareness of the United Nations standards of conduct and to implement the Secretary-General's zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse, including the new approach outlined in his report of February 2017 (A/71/818). UNMISS continued to implement the three-pronged approach of prevention, enforcement and remedial action and sought to strengthen its enforcement efforts through an expanded pool of conduct and discipline focal points. UNMISS also partnered with the United Nations country team in revamping the Inter-Agency Task Force on Protection against Sexual Exploitation and Abuse.

VII. Violations of the status-of-forces agreement, international humanitarian law, and security of United Nations personnel

59. During the reporting period, UNMISS recorded 43 violations of the status-of-forces agreement, at least seven of which were incidents involving violations by the Government of its obligation to ensure the safety and security of UNMISS, both staff and property. Of particular concern were the explosion of a rocket-propelled grenade above the UNMISS base in Bor fired from a Government-controlled location; an incident in which SPLA soldiers pointed their weapons at and advanced towards UNMISS forces inside the weapon-free zone outside the UNMISS protection sites in Juba; the firing of bullets near the UNMISS temporary operating base in Leer on two occasions; the firing of a heavy machine gun by an SPLA soldier in close proximity to the UNMISS Tomping compound in Juba; and an incident in which a National Security Services officer pointed a gun at an UNMISS member in Bor.

60. Other violations recorded by UNMISS included 14 incidents involving restriction of movement affecting UNMISS operations; one incident involving disregard for the inviolability of UNMISS premises; two cases of interference with the implementation of the UNMISS mandate; and 10 cases of arrest and detention of UNMISS members, seven of whom were released after periods of detention ranging from one day to one week. One staff member who was arrested on 23 August is still detained in Juba. Two other staff members who were arrested in 2014 have never been charged and UNMISS has been denied access since 2015. Four incidents were also recorded involving violations of the obligation to facilitate entry into and departure from South Sudan by immigration officials at Juba International Airport.

61. An increasing number of UNMISS personnel and international contractors have been harassed, threatened with deportation and/or asked to pay visa fees. Furthermore, the Government continued to impose immigration procedures specific to UNMISS staff and international contractors contrary to what has been agreed in the status-of-forces agreement. This has caused disruptions and significant delays to UNMISS flight operations and frequent backlogs of personnel awaiting clearance to enter the country.

62. Four incidents involving SPLA in Opposition were recorded, three of which entailed violations of freedom of movement, while one involved disregard for the inviolability of UNMISS premises. The Mission continues to notify the Government of violations through notes verbales and at meetings with relevant officials. A monthly matrix of incidents is also shared with the Government.

63. UNMISS continues implementing a series of security risk management measures aimed at enhancing the safety and security of United Nations personnel, adopted by the security management team following the crisis of July 2016. Review and assessment of the security situation and the use of an alert state system continue, addressing the prevailing security situation in a timely manner.

64. Despite the Government's stated consent to the deployment of the regional protection force, authorities continue to reject any activities related to protection of the Juba airport, which they maintain would be an infringement of national sovereignty. The arrival of the Rwandan advance company of the regional protection force late in August at the Tomping base adjacent to the airport prompted the Government to ground all UNMISS flight operations in the country for a period of three days. The issue was resolved following engagement by my Special Representative, and the subsequent relocation of the company to the Mission's base at the United Nations House on the outskirts of Juba. However, on 28 August, a company of Nepalese peacekeepers on a rotation from Wau to Juba was also denied access to the Tomping base by SPLA. UNMISS leadership continues to engage with the Government, the National Security Services and military hierarchies to address these obstructions and to clarify the mandate of the regional protection force.

VIII. Financial aspects

65. The General Assembly, by its resolution 71/308 of 30 June 2017, appropriated the amount of $1,071,000,000 for the maintenance of the Mission for the period from 1 July 2017 to 30 June 2018.

66. As at 1 September 2017, unpaid assessed contributions to the Special Account for UNMISS amount to $609.6 million. Total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations at the same date amount to $4,188.9 million.

67. Reimbursement of troop and formed police unit costs has been made for the period up to 30 April 2017, while reimbursement of the costs of contingent-owned equipment has been partially made for the period up to 31 March 2017, in accordance with the quarterly payment schedule.

IX. Observations and recommendations

68. Despite repeated calls from the international community, including the Security Council, there has been very limited progress made by the parties to cease hostilities and return to the path of dialogue and implementation of the peace agreement. As described in this report, hostilities have continued on the ground between SPLA and the Riek Machar faction of SPLA in Opposition, as well as other armed opposition groups. Of particular concern are the significant hostilities that have occurred in the Upper Nile region, where SPLA has undertaken major military offensives against opposition strongholds of strategic and symbolic significance. Conflict has also persisted between SPLA and various armed groups in Jonglei, greater Equatoria and greater Bahr el-Ghazal. This sustained level of conflict, well into the usually more calm rainy season, has had dire humanitarian consequences for civilians in the affected areas and disrupted life-saving humanitarian operations. The climate is also marked by abhorrent abuses of human rights, which continue unabated.

69. In the light of the ongoing fighting in different parts of the country, I urge the parties to honour their commitment to immediately cease hostilities and for the Government to restore the political freedoms necessary for peace. I call on the

Government to ensure respect for human rights and accountability for human rights violations, including through the establishment of all the transitional justice mechanisms under the peace agreement, and in this regard I am encouraged by the Government's willingness to engage with the African Union on the establishment of the court.

70. While I am encouraged by the increased engagement of IGAD towards revitalizing the peace agreement, questions remain over the commitment of the Government and the precise scope of the revitalization initiative. IGAD and Government officials have stressed that the revitalization initiative is designed to enhance the implementation of the peace agreement and is not a forum for renegotiation. Opposition leaders appear divided about the initiative, however, with some advocating a revision of the peace agreement to reflect the evolution and expansion of the conflict since the signing of the agreement, and others requesting a new process entirely outside the auspices of IGAD.

71. In parallel, the SPLM reunification talks in Uganda facilitated by President Museveni to recommit various SPLM factions to implementing the Arusha Agreement have been described by the participants as well as by IGAD as complementary to the IGAD revitalization initiative. Meanwhile, authorities within the Government of Kenya are consulting with opposition leaders with a view to a separate reconciliation initiative. The success of these various initiatives will depend on their ability to restore inclusivity in the implementation of the peace agreement and its core elements within a credible timeline, and coordination between regional and international partners will be essential to ensure their effectiveness.

72. While the National Dialogue Steering Committee has made efforts towards a more broadly representative and participatory dialogue process, key opposition leaders continue to voice scepticism about the credibility and inclusivity of the process. In public statements responding to requests of the Steering Committee leadership for meetings, Riek Machar and General Thomas Cirilo Swaka of the National Salvation Front Army welcomed a national dialogue process in principle, but stated that the current environment is not conducive to a genuine and participatory dialogue and that a negotiated peace process is needed first in order to end the ongoing violence. I welcome the announcement on 10 August of the release of 30 political detainees, and call on the Government to take further steps to ensure the release of remaining detainees and ensure that enabling conditions for a credible national dialogue are put in place. This includes enabling freedom of expression and of the media. I strongly condemn the continuing harassment and even killing of journalists as heinous acts which have no place in a democratic society.

73. I commend the efforts of UNMISS in the extensive consultations it has undertaken at the subnational and national level, with women representing a wide spectrum of stakeholders, including community and faith-based organizations, national and subnational parliaments and women's groups in UNMISS protection of civilians sites. I call upon the Mission to continue such dialogue, and I urge all partners to ensure that women, youth and elders continue to be part of the peace and political processes in South Sudan.

74. I must reiterate my calls on the Government to abide by its commitments to remove obstructions to UNMISS and humanitarian operations, including its consent to the full deployment of the regional protection force. While I was encouraged to see that the recent issues relating to the arrival of the Rwandan advance company were swiftly addressed, I remain concerned that some members of the Government continue to publicly question the intent of the force, and that these misunderstandings continue to result in significant obstructions. These actions,

along with continued movement restrictions and other violations of the status-of-forces agreement, as well as the shockingly high number of obstructions and incidents of harassment of humanitarian workers, undermine the ability of the United Nations and the international community to fulfil their mandates. I call on the Government to work with the United Nations and the humanitarian community in a spirit of partnership towards the common goal of bettering the lives of the people of South Sudan.

75. I wish to convey my sincere appreciation for the steadfast commitment of UNMISS military, police and civilian personnel, who, under the leadership of my Special Representative, David Shearer, continue to work courageously to protect hundreds of thousands of civilians, safeguard human rights, facilitate the work of humanitarians and promote an inclusive political process. I particularly thank the troop- and police-contributing countries that have provided much-needed uniformed personnel and assets to the Mission. I further commend the United Nations country team and non-governmental organization partners for their tremendous courage and sacrifice in providing vital humanitarian assistance to the population, under increasingly arduous and challenging conditions. I thank my Special Envoy, Nicholas Haysom, for his support to the peace process at the regional level and I commend the steadfast commitment of the Chair of the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission, President Festus Mogae, and the African Union High Representative, President Alpha Oumar Konaré, to address the plight of the civilian populations of South Sudan in partnership with the United Nations.

UNMISS
September 2017
SOUTH SUDAN
SUDAN
ETHIOPIA
KENYA
UGANDA
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
DEM REP OF THE CONGO
Juba
Malakal
Bentiu
Bor
Wau
Aweil
Abyei
Pibor
Yambio
Torit
Kapoeta
Lokichoggio
Lodwar
Moyale
Ed Damazin
Kadugli
Raga
Deim Zubeir
Kuacjok
Mayom
Parieng
Abiemnhom
Rumbek
Akobo
Nasser
Bunj
Melut
Umm Barat
Paloich
Penk
Kaya
Kaya Kerio
Lokichar
Lokitaung
Lodwar
Tambura
Ezo
Nadiangere
Maridi
Yei
Terakeka
Bundugiya
Lafon
Lowell
Torit
Kapoeta
Lokichoggio
Lodwar
Moyale
Ed Damazin
Kadugli
Raga
Deim Zubeir
Kuacjok
Mayom
Parieng
Abiemnhom
Rumbek
Akobo
Nasser
Bunj
Melut
Umm Barat
Paloich
Penk
Kaya
Kaya Kerio
Lokichar
Lokitaung
Lodwar
Tambura
Ezo
Nadiangere
Maridi
Yei
Terakeka
Bundugiya
Lafon
Lowell
Torit
Kapoeta
RPF (Juba)
BANGLADESH
NEPAL
RWANDA
National capital
State (wilayah) capital
Town
Major airport
International boundary
UNMISS operational northern limit*
State (wilayah) boundary
Sector boundary
Abyei region**
Main road
Railroad
* Final boundary between the Republic of the Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan has not yet been determined.
** Final status of the Abyei area is not yet determined.
The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.
0 100 200 km
0 100 mi
Department of Field Support
Geospatial Information Section (formerly Cartographic Section)
Map No. 4258 Rev. 29 UNITED NATIONS
September 2017

United Nations S/2017/785

Security Council

Distr.: General
18 September 2017

Original: English

Letter dated 13 September 2017 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to refer to the United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia, mandated through an exchange of letters (S/2007/279 and S/2007/280) between the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council dated 7 May 2007 and 15 May 2007, respectively.

Following the usual consultations, I would like to inform you of my intention to appoint Ms. Natalia Gherman (Republic of Moldova) as my Special Representative and Head of the United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia. She succeeds Mr. Petko Draganov (Bulgaria), who completed his assignment on 4 September 2017. I would like to take this opportunity to express my gratitude to Mr. Draganov for his dedication to and effective leadership of the Centre.

I should be grateful if you would bring this matter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) António **Guterres**

17-16283 (E) 180917

Please recycle

United Nations S/2017/786

Security Council

Distr.: General
18 September 2017

Original: English

Letter dated 15 September 2017 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 13 September 2017 (S/2017/785) concerning your intention to appoint Ms. Natalia Gherman (Republic of Moldova) as the new Special Representative and Head of the United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia has been brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council. They take note of the intention expressed in your letter.

(*Signed*) Tekeda **Alemu**
President of the Security Council

17-16284 (E) 180917

Please recycle

United Nations A/72/386–S/2017/787

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
18 September 2017

Original: English

General Assembly
Seventy-second session
Agenda item 34
Prevention of armed conflict

Security Council
Seventy-second year

Letter dated 15 September 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government I transmit herewith for your attention the record of the ceasefire violations by the Azerbaijani armed forces along the State border of the Republic of Armenia during the month of August 2017 (see annex I).*

I also transmit herewith for your attention the record of ceasefire violations registered by the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh Republic), during the month of August 2017 (see annex II).*

I kindly request that the present letter and its annexes be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 34, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Zohrab **Mnatsakanyan**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

* Circulated in the language of submission only.

17-16366 (E) 250917

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Annex I to the letter dated 15 September 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan along the State border with the Republic of Armenia

1-31 August 2017

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapons/number of shots*
1 August	Tavush, Gegharkunik Regions	10	Small arms and light weapons: 436
	Chinari	4	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 3
	Baghanis	2	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 44 (Daranak 20; Pambak 20; Chinari 4)
	Pambak	2	
	Daranak	2	Large-calibre machine guns: 180
2 August	Tavush, Gegharkunik Regions	12	Small arms and light weapons: 37
	Chinari	1	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 18 (Avazan 3; Chamarak 8; Berkaber 5; Berdavan 2)
	Paravakar	1	
	Berkaber	1	Large-calibre machine guns: 114
	Barekamavan	2	
	Berdavan	1	
	Baghanis	1	
	Avazan	1	
	Pambak	2	
	Chambarak	2	
3 August	Tavush, Gegharkunik Regions	4	Small arms and light weapons: 269
	Paravakar	1	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 27
	Avazan	2	Large-calibre machine guns: 60
	Pambak	1	
4 August	Tavush, Gegharkunik Regions	16	Small arms and light weapons: 457
	Aygedzor	4	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 80
	Chinari	2	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 55 (Aygedzor 30; Pambak 25)
	Movses	2	Large-calibre machine guns: 50
	Paravakar	2	
	N. Karmiraghbyur	1	
	Barekamavan	1	
	Voskevan	1	
	Ijil	2	
	Pambak	1	
5 August	Tavush, Gegharkunik Regions	5	Small arms and light weapons: 105
	Aygedzor	1	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 2
	Ijil	2	Grenade launchers: 4
	Daranak	1	
	Artanish	1	
6 August	Tavush, Gegharkunik Regions	3	Small arms and light weapons: 38
	Movses	1	
	Paravakar	1	
	Chambarak	1	

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapon/number of shots*
7 August	Tavush Region	2	Small arms and light weapons: 210
	Berdavan	1	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 4
	Voskevan	1	
8 August	Tavush Region	4	Small arms and light weapons: 17
	Aygedzor	1	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 9
	Aygepar	1	
	Movses	2	
9 August	Tavush, Gegharkunik Regions	4	Small arms and light weapons: 502
	Aygedzor	2	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 20 (Aygedzor 20)
	Jil	2	Grenade launchers: 4
10 August	Tavush Region	6	Small arms and light weapons: 35
	Aygedzor	2	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 12
	Aygepar	1	
	Movses	2	
	Vazashen	1	
11 August	Tavush, Gegharkunik Regions	14	Small arms and light weapons: 57
	Aygedzor	2	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 7
	Chinari	2	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 76 (Aygedzor 12; Chinari 4)
	Aygepar	4	Large-calibre machine guns: 40
	Paravakar	1	
	Movses	2	
	Vazashen	1	
	Voskevan	1	
	Jil	1	
12 August	Tavush, Gegharkunik Regions	6	Small arms and light weapons: 325
	Chinari	1	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 9 (Jil 8; Chinari 1)
	Aygedzor	3	
	Berkaber	1	
	Jil	1	
13 August	Tavush, Gegharkunik, Vayots Dzor Regions	10	Small arms and light weapons: 433
	Aygedzor	1	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 9 (Jil 8; Chinari 1)
	Chinari	2	Large-calibre machine guns: 50
	Aygepar	1	
	Kirants	1	
	Jil	2	
	Dprasnak	1	
	Tsapatagh	1	
	Khndzoresk	1	
14 August	Tavush, Gegharkunik, Vayots Dzor Regions	7	Small arms and light weapons: 532
	Chinari	1	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 20
	Chapni	2	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 76 (Chapni 75; Jil 1)
	Jil	2	Large-calibre machine guns: 80
	Geghamasar	1	
	Khachik	1	
15 August	Tavush Region	7	Small arms and light weapons: 71
	Chinari	4	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 21 (Aygedzor 21)
	Aygedzor	1	Large-calibre machine guns: 7

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapons/number of shots*
16 August	Tavush, Ararat, Gegharkunik, Syunik Regions	12	Small arms and light weapons: 226
	Chinari	3	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 6
	Movses	1	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 30 (Chinari 5, Jil 25)
	Eraskh	1	Large-calibre machine guns: 50
	Jil	6	
	Gorayk	1	
17 August	Tavush, Vayots Dzor Regions	3	Small arms and light weapons: 7
	Chinari	1	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 2
	Aygepar	1	
	Khndzorut	1	
18 August	Tavush, Vayots Dzor Regions	16	Small arms and light weapons: 335
	Aygedzor	8	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 56
	Chinari	2	Large-calibre machine guns: 60
	Aygepar	3	
	Vazashen	2	
	Khndzorut	1	
19 August	Tavush, Vayots Dzor Regions	5	Small arms and light weapons: 18
	Chinari	1	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 13
	Aygedzor	2	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 40 (Aygedzor 40)
	Aygepar	1	
	Khndzorut	1	
20 August	Tavush, Gegharkunik Regions	9	Small arms and light weapons: 50
	Chinari	4	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 3
	Aygedzor	2	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 3 (Vazashen 3)
	Vazashen	1	Large-calibre machine guns: 35
	Artanish	1	
	Chambarak	1	
21 August	Tavush, Gegharkunik Regions	5	Small arms and light weapons: 36
	Aygepar	2	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 2
	Barekamavan	1	
	Yeraskh	1	
	Daranak	1	
22 August	Tavush, Gegharkunik, Syunik Regions	8	Small arms and light weapons: 223
	Aygedzor	1	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 7
	Chinari	2	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 10 (Aygedzor 10)
	Kutakan	1	
	Jil	1	
	Geghamasar	1	
	Artanish	1	
	Gegh	1	
23 August	Tavush Region	2	Small arms and light weapons: 15
	Movses	1	
	Vazashen	1	

Date	Direction	Incidents	Type of weapons/number of shots
24 August	Tavush, Gegharkunik Regions	7	Small arms and light weapons: 163
	Aygedzor	1	Large-calibre machine guns: 60
	Chinari	1	
	Movses	1	
	Barekamavan	3	
	Avazan	1	
25 August	Tavush, Gegharkunik Regions	15	Small arms and light weapons: 136
	Aygedzor	3	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 16
	Chinari	3	Large-calibre machine guns: 45
	Berkaber	1	Grenade launchers: 2
	Vazashen	4	
	Berdavan	1	
	Barekamavan	1	
	Jil	1	
	Vahan	1	
26 August	Tavush, Gegharkunik Regions	3	Small arms and light weapons: 60
	Baghanis	1	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 2
	Jil	1	
	Daranak	1	
27 August	Tavush, Gegharkunik Regions	7	Small arms and light weapons: 66
	Aygedzor	1	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 14
	Chinari	1	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 2 (Paravakar 2)
	Paravakar	1	Large-calibre machine guns: 20
	N. Karmiraghbyur	1	
	Aygepar	1	
	Berkaber	1	
	Daranak	1	
28 August	Tavush, Gegharkunik Regions	8	Small arms and light weapons: 99
	Chinari	2	
	Paravakar	1	
	N. Karmiraghbyur	1	
	Sevkar	1	
	Khachik	2	
	Khndzoravt	1	
29 August	Tavush, Gegharkunik, Ararat Regions	7	Small arms and light weapons: 16
	Aygedzor	1	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 4
	Chinari	3	
	Aygepar	1	
	Jil	1	
	Yeraskh	1	
30 August	Tavush, Gegharkunik Regions	5	Small arms and light weapons: 81
	N. Karmiraghbyur	1	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 2
	Paravakar	1	Large-calibre sniper weapons: 2 (Vahan 2)
	Movses	1	
	Vahan	2	

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapons/number of shots*
31 August	Tavush, Gegharkunik, Syunik Regions	11	Small arms and light weapons: 290
	Aygedzor	2	Small-calibre sniper weapons: 4
	Paravakar	2	
	Movses	1	
	Aygepar	1	
	Berkaber	1	
	Barekamavan	1	
	Chapni	1	
	Jil	1	
	Vahan	1	

During the reporting period one soldier of the armed forces of the Republic of Armenia was wounded by fire from the Azerbaijani side.

Annex II to the letter dated 15 September 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan on the line of contact with the Republic of Artsakh (Nagorno Karabakh Republic)

1-31 August 2017

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapon/number of shots*
1 August	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Republic of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	20	Small arms and light weapons: 2,053 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 21 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 70 (Yanshak 60; Choporlu 10)
2 August	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Republic of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	59	Small arms and light weapons: 59 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 4
3 August	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Republic of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	18	Small arms and light weapons: 1,241 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 5 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 3 (Karakhanbeyli 3)
4 August	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Republic of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	16	Small arms and light weapons: 281 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 9 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 11 (Mehdili 6; Kurapatkino 1; Jraberd 3; Verin Chaylu 1) Small-calibre mortars: 2 (Bash Karvend 2)
5 August	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Republic of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	17	Small arms and light weapons: 187 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 31
6 August	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Republic of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	18	Small arms and light weapons: 378 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 20 Large-calibre machine guns: 3
7 August	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Republic of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	16	Small arms and light weapons: 199 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 2
8 August	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Republic of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	36	Small arms and light weapons: 624 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 20 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 6 (Mehdili 6) Large-calibre machine guns: 3
9 August	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Republic of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	24	Small arms and light weapons: 253 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 23 (Shikhlyar 3; Gyulistan 20) Large-calibre machine guns: 140
10 August	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Republic of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	25	Small arms and light weapons: 295 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 15 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 13 (Mehdili 5; Horadiz 3; Ashaghi Seydakhmedli 5) Large-calibre machine guns: 40
11 August	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Republic of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	23	Small arms and light weapons: 263 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 23 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 11(Ashaghi Seydakhmedli 4; Levonarkh 2; Gyulistan 5) Anti-aircraft systems: 50 (Taghibeyli 50)

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapons/number of shots*
12 August	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Republic of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	30	Small arms and light weapons: 509 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 1 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 9 (Shikhlyar 9)
13 August	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Republic of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	36	Small arms and light weapons: 698 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 16 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 2 (Shikhlyar 2) Large-calibre machine guns: 55 Grenade launchers: 1
14 August	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Republic of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	24	Small arms and light weapons: 153 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 2 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 8 (m. Mrov 8)
15 August	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Republic of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	35	Small arms and light weapons: 410 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 16 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 1 (Verin Chaylu 1)
16 August	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Republic of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	19	Small arms and light weapons: 224 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 1 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 8 (Levonarkh 8)
17 August	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Republic of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	21	Small arms and light weapons: 733 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 10 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 14 (Shikhlyar 5; Gyulistan 5; Gyamish 4) Large-calibre machine guns: 10
18 August	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Republic of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	27	Small arms and light weapons: 428 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 29 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 71 (Korgan 3; Jraberd 3; Levonarkh 5; Gyulistan 60) Large-calibre machine guns: 55
19 August	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Republic of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	27	Small arms and light weapons: 672 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 13 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 10 (Levonarkh 4; Jraberd 1; Talish 5)
20 August	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Republic of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	10	Small arms and light weapons: 118 Small caliber sniper weapons: 10 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 1 (Jraberd 1) Large-calibre machine guns: 5
21 August	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Republic of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	21	Small arms and light weapons: 293 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 18 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 5 (Talish 5)
22 August	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Republic of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	20	Small arms and light weapons: 452 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 6 Large-calibre machine guns: 10
23 August	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Republic of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	28	Small arms and light weapons: 472 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 18 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 15 (Gjulistan 15) Large-calibre machine guns: 17
24 August	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Republic of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	16	Small arms and light weapons: 40 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 15 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 3 (Nuzger 3)

Date	*Direction*	*Incidents*	*Type of weapons/number of shots*
25 August	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Republic of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	19	Small arms and light weapons: 366 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 26 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 17 (Mehdili 12; Kurapatkino 3; Levonarkh 2)
26 August	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Republic of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	14	Small arms and light weapons: 97 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 14 Large-calibre machine guns: 35
27 August	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Republic of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	24	Small arms and light weapons: 408 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 13 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 34 (Sarijanli 30; Gyulistan 4)
28 August	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Republic of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	19	Small arms and light weapons: 263 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 11
29 August	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Republic of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	9	Small arms and light weapons: 137 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 4
30 August	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Republic of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	28	Small arms and light weapons: 493 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 48 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 13 (Nuzger 1; Ashaghi Veysali 2; Gyulistan 10) Large-calibre machine guns: 55
31 August	On the line of contact between the armed forces of Republic of Artsakh and Azerbaijan	14	Small arms and light weapons: 92 Small-calibre sniper weapons: 5 Large-calibre sniper weapons: 14 (Verin Chaylu 5; Gyulistan 9) Large-calibre machine guns: 250

From 1 to 31 August, three soldiers of the Defence Army of the Republic of Artsakh were killed and one soldier was wounded by fire from the Azerbaijani side.

United Nations S/2017/788

Security Council

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21 September 2017

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Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Djibouti, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Iraq, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Peru, Poland, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America and Uruguay: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolutions 1265 (1999), 1325 (2000), 1368 (2001), 1373 (2001), 1624 (2005), 1894 (2009), 2106 (2013), 2150 (2014), 2170 (2014), 2178 (2014), 2199 (2015), 2242 (2015), 2249 (2015), 2253 (2015), 2322 (2016), 2331 (2016), 2341 (2017), 2347 (2017), 2354 (2017), 2367 (2017), 2368 (2017), 2370 (2017) and its relevant presidential statements,

Reaffirming its respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, independence and unity of Iraq, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

Recalling that the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as Da'esh) constitutes a global threat to international peace and security through its terrorist acts, its violent extremist ideology, its continued gross, systematic and widespread attacks directed against civilians, its violations of international humanitarian law and abuses of human rights, particularly those committed against women and children, and including those motivated by religious or ethnic grounds, and its recruitment and training of foreign terrorist fighters whose threat affects all regions and Member States,

Condemning the commission of acts by ISIL (Da'esh) involving murder, kidnapping, hostage-taking, suicide bombings, enslavement, sale into or otherwise forced marriage, trafficking in persons, rape, sexual slavery and other forms of sexual violence, recruitment and use of children, attacks on critical infrastructure, as well as its destruction of cultural heritage, including archaeological sites, and trafficking of cultural property,

Further recognising that the commission of such acts which may amount to war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide, is part of the ideology and strategic objectives of ISIL (Da'esh), and used by ISIL (Da'esh) as a tactic of terrorism, and that holding ISIL (Da'esh) members accountable, particularly those

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who bear the greatest responsibility, including in terms of leadership, which can include regional or mid-level commanders, and the ordering and commission of crimes, will further expose this, and could assist in countering terrorism and violent extremism which can be conducive to terrorism, including by stemming financing and the continued flow of international recruits to the terrorist group ISIL (Da'esh),

Welcoming the considerable efforts of the Government of Iraq to defeat ISIL (Da'esh), and its letter to the Secretary-General and Security Council dated 9 August 2017 calling for the assistance of the international community to ensure that members of ISIL (Da'esh) are held accountable for their crimes in Iraq, including where those may amount to crimes against humanity (S/2017/710),

1. *Reiterates* its condemnation of all violations of international humanitarian law, violations and abuses of international human rights law, and acts of terrorism, and expresses its determination that, having united to defeat the terrorist group ISIL (Da'esh), those responsible in this group for such acts, including those that may amount to war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide, must be held accountable;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to establish an Investigative Team, headed by a Special Adviser, to support domestic efforts to hold ISIL (Da'esh) accountable by collecting, preserving, and storing evidence in Iraq of acts that may amount to war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide committed by the terrorist group ISIL (Da'esh) in Iraq, to the highest possible standards, which should be addressed by the Terms of Reference referred to in paragraph 4, to ensure the broadest possible use before national courts, and complementing investigations being carried out by the Iraqi authorities, or investigations carried out by authorities in third countries at their request;

3. *Underlines* that the Special Adviser, while avoiding duplication of effort with other relevant United Nations bodies, will also promote throughout the world, accountability for acts that may amount to war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide committed by ISIL (Da'esh), and work with survivors, in a manner consistent with relevant national laws, to ensure their interests in achieving accountability for ISIL (Da'esh) are fully recognised;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit to the Security Council, for its approval, within 60 days, Terms of Reference acceptable to the Government of Iraq in order to ensure the Team can fulfil its mandate, and consistent with this resolution, in particular paragraph 6, regarding the operation of the Investigative Team in Iraq;

5. *Underscores* that the Investigative Team shall operate with full respect for the sovereignty of Iraq and its jurisdiction over crimes committed in its territory, and that the Team's Terms of Reference shall specify that Iraqi investigative judges, and other criminal experts, including experienced members of the prosecution services, will be appointed to the Team to work on an equal footing alongside international experts, and further underscores that evidence of crimes collected and stored by the Team in Iraq should be for eventual use in fair and independent criminal proceedings, consistent with applicable international law, conducted by competent national-level courts, with the relevant Iraqi authorities as the primary intended recipient as specified in the Terms of Reference, and with any other uses to be determined in agreement with the Government of Iraq on a case by case basis;

6. *Emphasizes* that the Team should be impartial, independent, and credible and should act consistent with the Terms of Reference which set out the framework in which the Team will operate, the Charter of the United Nations and United

Nations best practice, and relevant international law including international human rights law;

7. *Requests* that, after the Security Council has approved the Terms of Reference that are acceptable to the Government of Iraq, the Secretary-General undertake without delay the steps, measures, and arrangements necessary for the speedy establishment and full functioning of the Team, in accordance with the Terms of Reference, and notify it when the Team begins its work;

8. *Underlines* that the Team should ensure its Iraqi members benefit from international expertise on the Team, and make every effort to share knowledge and technical assistance with Iraq;

9. *Encourages* Member States, and regional and intergovernmental organisations, to provide appropriate legal assistance and capacity building to the Government of Iraq in order to strengthen its courts and judicial system;

10. *Calls* on all other States to cooperate with the Team including through mutual arrangements on legal assistance, where necessary and appropriate, and in particular to provide it with any relevant information as appropriate they may possess pertaining to its mandate under this resolution;

11. *Underlines* that another Member State in whose territory ISIL (Da'esh) has committed acts that may amount to war crimes, crimes against humanity, or genocide, may request the Team to collect evidence of such acts, but only with the approval of the Security Council which may request the Secretary-General to submit separate Terms of Reference with regards to the operation of the Team in that State;

12. *Requests* the Team to cooperate, as appropriate, and consistent with its investigative functions in paragraph 2, with the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team established pursuant to resolution 1526 (2004) and 2368 (2017) and with any other relevant monitoring bodies, and to work with other United Nations bodies within their respective mandates;

13. *Requests* the Secretary-General to establish, as a supplement to financing as an expense of the Organisation, a trust fund to receive voluntary contributions to implement this resolution;

14. *Calls* on States, and regional and intergovernmental organisations, to contribute funds, equipment and services to the Team including the offer of expert personnel in support of the implementation of this resolution;

15. *Requests* the Special Adviser to complete the first report of the Team's activities, within 90 days of the date on which it commences its activities, as notified by the Secretary-General, and to complete subsequent reports every 180 days thereafter, and requests the Special Adviser to present these reports to the Security Council;

16. *Decides* to review the mandate of the Special Adviser and Team after a period of two years, with any further extension to be decided at the request of the Government of Iraq, or any other government that has requested the Team to collect evidence of acts that may amount to war crimes, crimes against humanity, or genocide, committed by ISIL (Da'esh) in its territory;

17. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

United Nations S/2017/789

Security Council

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20 September 2017

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Letter dated 20 September 2017 from the Panel of Experts on South Sudan addressed to the President of the Security Council

The members of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan, whose mandate was extended pursuant to Security Council resolution 2353 (2017), have the honour to transmit herewith the Panel's 120-day report, which was submitted in accordance with paragraph 2 of resolution 2353 (2017), by which the provisions of paragraph 12 (e) of resolution 2290 (2016) were renewed.

The report was provided to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2206 (2015) concerning South Sudan on 6 September 2017.

The Panel would appreciate it if the present letter and the report were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

(*Signed*) Klem **Ryan**
Coordinator
Panel of Experts on South Sudan

(*Signed*) Andrews **Atta-Asamoah**
Expert

(*Signed*) Andrei **Kolmakov**
Expert

(*Signed*) Ann **Oosterlinck**
Expert

(*Signed*) Colin **Thomas-Jensen**
Expert

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Report of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan

Summary

In line with its previous reports, the Panel of Experts on South Sudan has found that the principal threats to the people of South Sudan remain the failure of the parties to the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan to implement the key provisions of the Agreement and the continued pursuit of a military solution to the conflict. Since the Panel's report of 13 April 2017 (S/2017/326), there has been no substantive progress in establishing security for the civilian population, owing to ongoing violence, much of it ethnic-based, and the associated nationwide humanitarian crisis. The reason for this failure is clear: in the wake of the de facto collapse of the transitional government of national unity in July 2016, there is currently no political will to implement the Agreement among those with the power to do so, nor any political will to address the destructive governance practices and historical grievances that continue to drive the conflict in South Sudan.[a] This is a failure of leadership on the part of the political and military elite of the country, with the primary responsibility for the ongoing violence resting with those in the Government, led by the President, Salva Kiir, and the First Vice-President, Taban Deng Gai.

The Panel notes that Government military offensives in recent months in Jonglei, Upper Nile and parts of Equatoria have substantially worsened the humanitarian situation for many more South Sudanese. The population faces intersecting threats of violence and insecurity, large-scale population displacement, extreme food insecurity and an escalating national economic crisis. The actions of South Sudanese leaders have done nothing to address these threats, and there is unlikely to be an improvement in the foreseeable future absent a significant change in the national and international approach to the conflict.

[a] In the present report, the terms "transitional government of national unity" and its short form, "transitional government", are used to refer to the entity described in the Agreement or the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan, in which a power-sharing arrangement was envisaged, centred on the Government, the opposition led by Riek Machar and the "former detainees". The term "Government" is used to refer to the current political configuration led by Salva Kiir. That configuration does not include the opposition represented by Machar and is therefore not the entity envisaged in the Agreement. The Panel considers this to be an important distinction, since the issue of whether the Government is adhering to the arrangements envisaged in the Agreement is a significant source of the ongoing conflict. The focus of the report will, therefore, be on threats to the people of South Sudan rather than on the transitional government.

I. Background

A. Mandate

1. In its resolution 2353 (2017), in renewing the provisions of paragraph 12 (e) of its resolution 2290 (2016), the Security Council requested, among other things, that the Panel of Experts on South Sudan provide the Council with an analysis of the current security threats facing the transitional government of national unity and its need to maintain law and order in South Sudan, as well as further analysis on the role of transfers of arms and related materiel coming into South Sudan since the formation of the transitional government with respect to the implementation of the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan and threats to United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and other United Nations and international humanitarian personnel.

B. Methodology

2. The present report was prepared on the basis of research and interviews conducted by the Panel during July and August 2017,[1] as well as a review of available documents from the Government of South Sudan, regional entities, including the Intergovernmental Authority on Development and the African Union, and international organizations working on issues pertaining to South Sudan. The report also draws on earlier work by the Panel, including previous reports to the Security Council, both public and confidential, hundreds of interviews with key stakeholders and a large body of information and evidence provided by a wide range of sources.[2]

II. Overview and structure

3. The analysis provided in the report is structured around what the Panel sees as the key threats faced by the people of South Sudan. The Panel has considered three factors in the conflict and the threats related thereto: (a) the political conflict for power, which has increasingly transitioned to ethnically based violence; (b) the continued deterioration of economic conditions and associated hardship for most South Sudanese citizens; and (c) the ongoing humanitarian crisis involving nationwide food insecurity, mass population displacement and disease epidemics.

4. The expansion of the conflict since the violent collapse of the transitional government in July 2016 has significantly increased the number and geographical spread of groups now opposing the Government. Consequently, questions have been raised regarding the degree to which the Agreement remains sufficiently inclusive or even workable.

5. The hostilities in South Sudan continue against a complex backdrop of competing regional and bilateral initiatives to resolve the conflict. These efforts suffer from several defects, including inadequate oversight, lack of enforcement and the absence of an integrated, coherent plan for peace. This lack of coherence is illustrative of conflicting interests compounded by underlying rivalries in the

[1] The Panel wishes to draw the attention of the Security Council to the fact that the members of the Panel were not appointed until 11 July 2017 (see S/2017/594) and therefore commenced work on the current mandate only in late July, thereby reducing the time available for the preparation of the present report.

[2] The Panel's methodology for its investigations, including with respect to confidential sources, has been detailed in previous reports, most recently in its report of 13 April 2017 (S/2017/326).

region. The Government has sought to exploit such divisions to limit the effective implementation of the Agreement. As a result of the lack of clear international action, the regionally led efforts to revitalize the Agreement, repair divisions within the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), promote a credible and inclusive national dialogue and otherwise encourage discussion between the parties to the conflict have all demonstrably failed to halt the fighting.

6. A specific remit of the present report is to assess the role of arms in relation to the implementation of the Agreement. The ongoing military operations in the country, in particular the government offensive in Upper Nile in July and August 2017, indicate significant continued military expenditure. Furthermore, the countrywide violence illustrates that arms, rather than being tools that help to improve security for the people of South Sudan, continue to create suffering and instability. The Panel's investigations point to the long-term trend that weapons sold to South Sudan are invariably turned against civilians, either directly by security services and associated militias, or by armed groups and criminals with access to such weapons. Further unregulated arms transfers will only exacerbate the threat of violence for citizens. The Panel therefore maintains the position expressed in its previous reports that the effective regulation of arms in South Sudan must involve the imposition of an arms embargo by the Security Council and be enforced by regional actors.

III. Threats to the people of South Sudan

A. Political and ethnic conflict for power

7. The conflict in South Sudan is characterized by complex and dynamic interactions between disputes at the national and subnational levels. Local political rivalries at the county or state level, fuelled by disputes over land, access to resources or unaddressed injustices sometimes reaching back decades, often have their corollary at the national level, as senior political and military figures seek to exploit local divisions to mobilize support and gain political influence. The Government's dispute with the opposition led by Riek Machar, which marked the beginning of the conflict, has transformed into a multifaceted set of local clashes which have, in turn, led to a proliferation of armed groups, usually mobilized along ethnic lines.

8. Since the collapse of the transitional government, the Machar-led opposition has been weakened by three factors: (a) Machar's physical isolation in South Africa and his exclusion from political processes have affected coordination and cohesion within the opposition;[3] (b) the opposition has been unable to find sufficient logistical support to pursue significant military operations; and (c) new opposition groups, created through defections from both the Government and the opposition, have emerged to compete for local support and inclusion in national and regional political processes.[4]

9. However, the opposition's relative weakness has not led to a concomitant diminishing of the conflict. Rather than implement the Agreement or seek to negotiate political solutions from a position of relative strength, the Government has sought to further exploit its advantage in military materiel — and in the absence of external restraints — to subdue civilian populations in areas considered to be sympathetic to the opposition. Since the beginning of 2017, the Government has

[3] Panel interviews with opposition representatives in Nairobi and Addis Ababa, August 2017.

[4] An example of this fragmentation of the opposition can be seen in the defection in late July 2017 of the Sudan People's Liberation Army in Opposition commander, Lieutenant General John Kenyi Loburon, to the National Salvation Front, led by General Thomas Cirillo Swaka, which threatens conflict between opposition groups in Equatoria.

conducted large-scale offensives in Upper Nile, targeting the Agwelek forces under Johnson Olony and the Shilluk population on the west bank of the Nile River in February and March, and the predominantly Nuer territories in northern Jonglei in April. It has also maintained violent counter-insurgency operations in parts of Central and Eastern Equatoria.

10. In early July 2017, in violation of its own unilateral ceasefire, the Government launched an offensive to capture the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) in Opposition headquarters at Pagak, in north-eastern Upper Nile. Pagak had served as Machar's military headquarters since he fled Juba in December 2013.[5] The government offensive resulted in thousands of (predominantly Nuer) civilians fleeing into neighbouring Ethiopia.[6] On 29 August, the Minister of Defence and Veterans' Affairs, Kuol Manyang, reaffirmed the Government's stance on the fighting during a meeting of the joint operations force in Juba, during which he stated that the Government would seek to "crush" all remaining "rebels" in South Sudan after 30 days had passed, thereby apparently referring to plans for further offensive operations by government forces in the coming months.[7]

11. Military advances by the Government in parts of the country have, however, been offset by growing tensions and fighting within the fragile coalition of political and military actors supporting the President. Increasingly fractious and violent intra-tribal disputes among Dinka clans over the conduct and burden of the conflict, the distribution of power and the issue of the eventual successor to the President have all contributed to fighting in Aweil and Gogrial in recent months.

12. The removal of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) Chief of General Staff, Paul Malong, by the President in May 2017 laid bare many of the tensions between Malong's home community of Aweil and Dinka from Warrap, the President's home area, and Bor, home to Kuol Manyang and the Minister of Information and Broadcasting, Michael Makuei.[8] Those tensions have been exacerbated by the worsening economic situation and food insecurity, which have caused significant hardship in many Dinka communities, particularly those in Aweil, and have led to discontent with the Government stemming from a perception that Dinka forces from Aweil have borne a disproportionate burden of the casualties resulting from the war.[9] In July, the President declared a state of emergency in

[5] In a telephone interview, Machar told the Panel that Pagak was only a meeting place and was "not a significant opposition base or headquarters", 8 August 2017.

[6] According to humanitarian agencies, the majority of the civilian population has now fled Pagak, Maiwut and Mathiang, as a result of the recent offensive, with many passing into Ethiopia, although only 1,600 new refugees from South Sudan were registered in Ethiopia between 15 June and 15 July. Many more have crossed the border but, according to humanitarian agencies, are avoiding registering as refugees, fearing that they may be relocated to camps away from Gambela. As at the time of writing of the present report, control of Pagak remains contested, with the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army in Opposition claiming to have launched a counteroffensive.

[7] This account was provided to international organizations by meeting attendees and also reported in the South Sudanese media, and was confirmed by the Minister in a meeting with the Panel in Juba on 12 September 2017.

[8] Panel interviews conducted in Juba in May 2017 and in Nairobi, Kampala and Addis Ababa in July and August 2017.

[9] Confidential report based on interviews conducted in Aweil by an international researcher, on file with the Panel. In February 2017, according to the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification for Northern Bahr el-Ghazal, out of an overall population of about 1,400,000, some 560,000 people were estimated to be in crisis (phase 3) and 180,000 in emergency (phase 4). In June 2017, those estimates were updated to 640,000 in crisis and 310,000 in emergency. For comparative and up-to-date figures on the food insecurity situation in South Sudan, see the full analysis report from January 2017, available from www.ipcinfo.org/ipcinfo-detail-forms/ipcinfo-map-detail/en/c/471270/, and the global alert from June 2017, available from www.ipcinfo.org/ipcinfo-detail-forms/ipcinfo-news-detail/en/c/897072.

Gogrial and Aweil East, as well as in Tonj and Wau, all four areas having been affected by the intra-Dinka violence.[10] As at the end of August, fighting between Dinka groups in the vicinity of Aweil was ongoing.[11]

13. Divisions within the government coalition are also evident in the conflict between the Bor Dinka and neighbouring Murle in Jonglei. The long-standing cycle of violent raids and reprisals between the communities worsened substantially in 2017, as government-armed militias from Bor (see section V. below on weapons) conducted large-scale attacks into Murle areas, specifically targeting civilian locations. Those attacks have effectively ended the peace agreement signed in May 2014 between the Government and the Murle opposition led by David Yau Yau, with Murle community forces increasingly aligning with the armed opposition, including the National Salvation Front of Thomas Cirillo Swaka.[12]

B. Deterioration of economic conditions

14. The economic situation in South Sudan has grown worse during 2017 as government revenues have fallen further, while expenditure on the armed forces has remained the government's priority.[13]

15. The majority of people in South Sudan are not a part of the formal economy, existing rather on subsistence or barter, with few financial links to the central Government. However, for the members of the urban population who do depend on the formal economy, the already-limited financial resources available have become ever scarcer as the war has persisted. Inflation is estimated to have exceeded 360 per cent by the end of June 2017,[14] severely affecting the ability of many people to buy staple foods. A kilogram of sorghum in Juba in May was selling for 88.57 South Sudanese pounds, representing a rise of more than 300 per cent since the previous year. Similarly, in Aweil and Wau, the price was over 200 per cent higher than it was at the same time in 2016.[15]

16. Part of that increase is attributable to the rapid loss in value of the South Sudanese pound affecting food importation. The exchange rate in Juba in early August 2017 was in the range of 160-180 South Sudanese pounds to the dollar. In December 2013, the rate was 4 to 1. The rapid devaluation exacerbates the Government's revenue shortfall, which, among other things, has affected its ability to pay salaries. Many civil servants have not been paid during the three months prior to the time of writing,[16] and in some cases, including for many embassy

[10] Nabeel Biajo and Waakhe Simon Wudu, "South Sudan declares state of emergency in four states", Voice of America News, 8 July 2017. Available from www.voanews.com/a/south-sudan-declares-state-of-emergency-in-four-states/3949486.html.

[11] Radio Tamazuj, "Government troops say repulsed rebel attack in Aweil East", 30 August 2017. Available from https://radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/government-troops-says-repulsed-rebel-attack-in-aweil-east.

[12] Interviews with three high-level confidential sources having direct knowledge of the issue, Juba, May 2017, and Addis Ababa, August 2017.

[13] Agence France Presse, "War-torn South Sudan passes budget despite lacking funds", News24, August 30, 2017. Available from www.news24.com/Africa/News/war-torn-south-sudan-passes-budget-despite-lacking-funds-20170829.

[14] Trading Economics, "South Sudan inflation rate 2008-2017". Available from https://tradingeconomics.com/south-sudan/inflation-cpi.

[15] Famine Early Warning Systems Network, "South Sudan food security outlook: June 2017 to January 2018", July 2017. Available from http://www.fews.net/sites/default/files/documents/reports/SOUTH%20SUDAN%20Food%20Security%20Outlook_06302017.pdf.

[16] Radio Tamazuj, "South Sudan government admits difficulty in paying civil servants", 7 July 2017. Available from https://radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/south-sudan-government-admits-difficulty-in-paying-civil-servants.

officials, the wait has been much longer.[17] The Government has repeatedly approached donors for assistance so that it can pay salaries, but has increasingly struggled to find external financial support as the war has continued. According to one diplomatic source who spoke with the Panel, such efforts have included a request in recent weeks for donors to pay military salaries.[18]

17. In response to insufficient revenues, the Government is considering cutting costs by removing fuel subsidies to Nile Petroleum Corporation for the importation of fuel for domestic consumption. Lifting the oil subsidies would save the Government an estimated $183 million annually.[19] The short-term impact, however, would likely be a rapid increase in transport costs, further affecting food prices.

18. The Government has responded to its fiscal shortfall by attempting to raise oil production and attracting additional foreign investment in the oil and natural resource sectors. However, those efforts have met with limited success. Current oil production is estimated at 130,000 barrels per day, approximately 37 per cent of the pre-conflict level. The Ministry of Petroleum declared its short-term objective to boost the output to 200,000 barrels per day by the end of 2017, including the drilling of 30 new wells.[20] However, those figures will be difficult to achieve given the ongoing insecurity in the oil-producing regions of Upper Nile, Unity and Northern Liech.[21]

19. Insecurity along the main supply routes from Uganda has also negatively affected supplies to Juba and contributed to price increases. Various groups opposed to the Government are believed to be responsible for some of these attacks, in particular along the critical Juba-Nimule road, through which they are seeking to pressure the Government by threatening the capital's key supply line.[22] In response, the Government has sought support from Uganda (and latterly UNMISS) in securing the roads that supply Juba.[23]

20. Commercial services have also been adversely affected by the withdrawal of formal banking services in many locations. Since the start of 2017, Kenya Commercial Bank has closed five branches in the country after sustaining losses for 2016 amounting to 2.8 billion South Sudanese pounds.[24] Similarly, Equity Bank Group confirmed the closure of 7 of its 12 branches in South Sudan after the devaluation of the South Sudanese pound resulted in the bank writing off

[17] Interview with a source from the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), 1 August 2017, and communication with diplomatic officials in New York, July 2017.

[18] Interview with a diplomatic official, Addis Ababa, August 2017.

[19] Jale Richard, "Fuel subsidies to be lifted in 2017-2018 budget", Gurtong, 8 July 2017. Available from www.gurtong.net/ECM/Editorial/tabid/124/ctl/ArticleView/mid/519/articleId/20671/Fuel-Subsidies-To-Be-Lifted-In-2017-2018-Budget.aspx.

[20] Reuters, "South Sudan boosts oil output, targets 350,000 bpd peak by mid-2018", Citizen Digital, 5 June 2017. Available from https://citizentv.co.ke/business/south-sudan-boosts-oil-output-targets-350000-bpd-peak-by-mid-2018-167490.

[21] Sudan Tribune, "South Sudan army says foiled attack on Upper Nile oilfields", 23 July 2017. Available from www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?iframe&page=imprimable2&id_article=63064.

[22] Radio Tamazuj, "SPLA-IO claims responsibility for convoy attack on Juba-Nimule road", 9 June 2017. Available from https://radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/south-sudan-rebels-claim-responsibility-for-convoy-attack-on-juba-nimule-road.

[23] Joint communiqué between Uganda police and South Sudan police, available from www.upf.go.ug/joint-communique-uganda-police-s-sudan-police; and UNMISS, "Press conference on arrival of regional protection forces into Juba, South Sudan", 8 August, 2017, available from https://unmiss.unmissions.org/press-conference-arrival-regional-protection-forces-juba-south-sudan.

[24] Reuters, "KCB closes South Sudan outlets, cites hyperinflation", *Star*, 13 May 2017. Available from www.the-star.co.ke/news/2017/05/13/kcb-closes-south-sudan-outlets-cites-hyperinflation_c1560178.

$58.14 million of debt in 2016.[25] The departure of foreign banks from South Sudan further restricts opportunities for new loans and investment in the economy.

C. Humanitarian crisis

21. Ongoing ethnic violence throughout the country remains an overwhelming threat to the South Sudanese population. Civilians continue to be subjected to extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrest and detention, enforced disappearance, sexual violence, forced recruitment, forced displacement, restricted freedom of movement, harassment and the destruction of livelihoods by all parties to the conflict.[26] As a consequence, the population faces several intersecting and mutually compounding threats.

Forced population displacement

22. Approximately 1 in 3 South Sudanese had been displaced from their homes as at the time of reporting, compared to 1 in 12 during the first year of the crisis.[27] As at 31 July 2017, some 2 million had been internally displaced, and approximately 2 million more had fled the country. Uganda hosts around 1 million of those who have fled, with approximately 250,000 of those having arrived since February 2017.[28]

23. In Upper Nile, as documented in previous Panel reports (see S/2016/70 and S/2017/326), the Government has launched repeated attacks on the west bank of the Nile since 2015. Such offensives have forced the vast majority of the Shilluk population into the UNMISS site for the protection of civilians in Malakal or across the border into the Sudan. Humanitarian agencies estimate that there are currently fewer than 17,000 Shilluk left in Upper Nile outside of the Malakal site, concentrated mainly in camps for internally displaced persons in and around Aburoc. This depopulation has occurred with the full knowledge of the President, Cabinet ministers and senior military officers and has been a clearly foreseeable consequence of the Government's military operations.[29]

[25] Reuters, "Equity Bank closes seven branches in war-torn South Sudan", *Star*, 24 May 2017. Available from www.the-star.co.ke/news/2017/05/24/equity-bank-closes-seven-branches-in-war-torn-south-sudan_c1567328.

[26] Panel interviews with humanitarian workers and United Nations staff in New York in July 2017, and in Nairobi and Kampala and by telephone in August 2017.

[27] International Organization for Migration, "IOM responds as rainy season threatens further spread of cholera in South Sudan", 8 August 2017. Available from https://southsudan.iom.int/media-and-reports/press-release/iom-responds-rainy-season-threatens-further-spread-cholera-south.

[28] For the most up-to-date figures, see the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees regional and operational updates on the situation in South Sudan, available from http://data.unhcr.org/SouthSudan/regional.php.

[29] In a meeting in Juba on 5 May between the Panel Coordinator, the President and the Minister of Information and Broadcasting, Michael Makuei, during a discussion of the population displacement affecting the Shilluk in Upper Nile, Makuei stated that the internally displaced persons in Wau Shilluk "are not civilians, they are rebels". There was no indication during the meeting, from either Makuei or the President, that they viewed the situation on the west bank in Upper Nile as concerning or as a priority for the Government in terms of humanitarian operations. The Panel has also received confidential information from Western intelligence sources that supports the view that the displacement of Shilluk is a military strategy.

Severe food insecurity

24. Despite a large-scale humanitarian response in 2017, severe food insecurity has continued to rise at rates faster than projected.[30] By July, 6 million people in South Sudan, representing at least half of the country's estimated population, were assessed to be severely food-insecure, including 1.7 million people on the brink of famine.[31] In particular, the Panel notes the repeated government offensives in southern Unity that have prevented the civilian population from growing sufficient crops, tending livestock or receiving sustained, adequate food aid (see S/2017/326).

Disease

25. Repeated displacement, food insecurity and the lack of sustained access to services, coupled with the rainy season, have led to the deadliest cholera outbreak since independence,[32] as well as outbreaks of malaria, measles and other waterborne and infectious diseases in several locations. Otherwise-treatable diseases are now killing or incapacitating large numbers of South Sudanese.[33]

Access restrictions

26. All parties to the conflict continue to regularly impede humanitarian access. There was an increase in recorded impediment incidents, from 89 in May to 100 in June and 136 in July, the highest number reported to date in 2017.[34] Most reported access incidents arose from restriction or denial of movement or from threats against staff members, forcing them to be evacuated.[35]

Attacks against aid workers

27. As of July, at least 17 aid workers had been killed in 2017, with a total of 84 reported killed since December 2013.[36]

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[30] See the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification projections for January-July 2017 with regard to South Sudan, available from www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_South_Sudan_Key%20Messages_Feb2017.pdf.

[31] Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, "South Sudan situation report", 18 July 2017. Available from http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/emergencies/docs/FAOSouthSudanSituationReport_18July2017.pdf.

[32] Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, "Humanitarian bulletin: South Sudan", No. 12, 28 July 2017. Available from http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/SS_170728_OCHA_SouthSudan_Humanitarian_Bulletin12.pdf.

[33] World Health Organization, "South Sudan Health Cluster bulletin", No. 6, 30 June 2017. Available from http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Health-Cluster-Bulletin-1-to-30-June-2017.pdf.

[34] Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, "South Sudan: humanitarian access situation snapshot", May 2017, June 2017 and July 2017. Available from http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ss_20170606_access_snapshot_may_final.pdf, http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ss_20170709_access_snapshot_june.pdf and http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/SS_20170808_Access_Snapshot_July_final.pdf, respectively.

[35] For example, on 30 June and 3 July 2017, UNMISS received letters from the Bor Community Youth Association demanding that all Equatorians working for United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations leave Bor within 72 hours, or action would be taken. UNMISS decided to provide temporary accommodation within its base in Bor for Equatorian staff members who felt unsafe to return to their homes. From United Nations internal reports seen by the Panel.

[36] United Nations Children's Fund, "South Sudan humanitarian situation report", No. 111, 20 July 2017. Available from http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/UNICEF%20South%20Sudan%20Mid-Year%20Humanitarian%20SitRep%20%28%23111%29%20-%2020%20July%202017.pdf.

28. Following interviews conducted with humanitarian organizations operating in affected areas, the Panel finds that government forces perpetrate the majority of such abuses by targeting civilians on the basis of their perceived association with opposition groups, which is often linked to their ethnicity.[37]

IV. Regional developments

29. The humanitarian, security and economic fallout from the conflict continues to adversely affect neighbouring States. However, those effects are yet to result in unified and sustained action from the States members of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) towards a coherent political process backed by genuine pressure on the parties. Renewed regional efforts to end the conflict led, in July 2017, to the creation of a high-level revitalization forum for parties to the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan and what were termed "estranged groups" to discuss how to restore a permanent ceasefire, fully implement the Agreement and develop timelines for elections at the end of the transition.[38] At the same time, the President of Uganda, Yoweri Museveni, reportedly at the request of Salva Kiir,[39] has embarked on a bilateral effort to resuscitate the Arusha process of 2015, which sought the reunification of SPLM. On 20 July, he met Kiir in Kampala and facilitated meetings between members of the former detainees, SPLA in Opposition (Taban faction) and SPLM in Government. A third process, led by Kenya, is seeking to bring together South Sudanese opposition groups.[40]

30. Collectively, those processes reflect the region's continued recognition of the need to end the war, but weaknesses are evident in their approaches. The proliferation of diplomatic efforts has created an opportunity for the parties to "forum shop", whereby they engage selectively in various processes while buying time for military operations and avoid attempts to enforce a political settlement to the conflict. Furthermore, the effort by the high-level revitalization forum to address the lack of inclusiveness in the revitalization process did not provide a clear definition of what constitutes an estranged group, which is a prerequisite to expanding the process to those currently excluded from the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict.[41] Some opposition groups have also argued that the region's continued exclusion of Riek Machar, with the support of the United States of America, is counterproductive and undermines the need for neutral engagement with the parties to the conflict by countries in the region, including South Africa.[42]

31. Even though the security situation in South Sudan continues to deteriorate and fighting persists in many parts of the country, creating enormous disruption, the

[37] Panel interviews with humanitarian organizations and United Nations personnel in New York in July 2017, and in Nairobi and Kampala and by telephone in August 2017.

[38] Intergovernmental Authority on Development, "Communiqué of the 57th extraordinary session of the IGAD Council of Ministers on South Sudan", 2 July 2017. Available from https://igad.int/communique/1586-communique-of-the-57th-extra-ordinary-session-of-the-igad-council-of-ministers.

[39] Interview with members of opposition groups involved in the Kampala process, Nairobi, 23 July 2017.

[40] Panel discussions with South Sudanese opposition groups, July and August 2017.

[41] These were among the key points made by many participants at a gathering of South Sudanese experts, facilitated by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, held in Ethiopia in August 2017. According to some of those present, many of the participants also voiced strong criticisms of the Authority's handling of the conflict.

[42] Interviews with various South Sudanese opposition groups, July and August 2017; and a telephone interview with Machar, in which he described his status in South Africa as being in "detention", 8 August 2017.

region has made the development of a timeline for elections, in line with the provisions of the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict, one of the key objectives of the revitalization forum.[43] The plan for national elections in 2018 has also been promoted by the Government. However, it is clear from the threats currently facing the population, coupled with the fact that more than a third has been displaced by the war, that elections would likely be viewed by a significant portion as illegitimate. Without improvements in security, greater transparency, genuine political reforms, the establishment of effective accountability mechanisms and political inclusion, elections pose a significant threat of further violence.[44]

32. Since the signing, in 2015, of the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan, the international community has not been able to generate the leverage necessary to support the political reform and reconciliation process in South Sudan. Each IGAD member is dealing with significant national challenges that, coupled with long-standing and complex regional rivalries, continue to undermine consensus on South Sudan. More broadly, the leadership of the United States and other nations that previously exerted leverage in the region has also waned considerably in 2017. Consequently, without a significant shift towards a more coherent and unified approach by Authority members, alongside broader international support for a single and inclusive political process, current efforts are unlikely to lead to the implementation of the Agreement or to halt the violence in South Sudan.

V. Weapons

A. Upper Nile

33. The ongoing government offensives in Upper Nile and threats of future offensives made by the Minister of Defence and Veterans' Affairs, as noted in paragraphs 9, 10 and 23 above, are strong indications of continued weapons procurement by the Government. The Panel has not had access to Pagak during its current mandate to inspect weapons or military vehicles in the area, but has reviewed photographs of vehicles used during recent operations. The Panel notes that the armoured vehicles used by government forces in Upper Nile (see figure I) strongly resemble vehicles allegedly captured by Sudanese forces during operations in Darfur in June 2017 (see figure II). Investigations are continuing into the manufacturer (which is likely to be the same for both of the vehicles pictured) and supplier of the vehicles, with a view to establishing whether they came from the same source.

[43] The Agreement states that the National Election Commission shall organize elections for President, the National Assembly, state governors and state assemblies 60 days prior to the end of the transition period and shall ensure that the outcome is broadly reflective of the will of the electorate (see S/2015/654, paragraph 16.5).

[44] The Panel shares the assessment expressed by the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Sudan and South Sudan, in his statement to the Security Council on 24 August 2017, that "the prevailing insecurity, internal and external population displacement, the lack of appropriate institutions or a reasonably level political playing field, in an increasingly divided ethnic environment, militate against organizing credible elections within the year. Indeed, it may well contribute to deepening and extending the conflict" (S/PV.8030).

Figure I
Armoured vehicle, Upper Nile, near Maiwut, July 2017

Source: Confidential.

Figure II
Armoured vehicle, Khartoum, August 2017

Source: Panel of Experts on the Sudan.

B. Opposition procurement

34. In line with the findings reported in the Panel's earlier reports, access to arms by opposition forces remains limited; there is no evidence that any opposition group has been able to procure significant external sources of weapons and ammunition. The weapons and ammunition observed in the possession of the opposition in the past year were likely obtained predominantly through battlefield capture or taken from the Government during defections. One opposition commander operating in the Equatorias told the Panel that his forces were acquiring individual weapons that were being sold by government soldiers who had not received their pay and had deserted.[45] While the Panel cannot independently corroborate this claim, the sale of government weapons in local markets had previously been reported to the Panel in

[45] Interview with high-ranking opposition officer, Addis Ababa, August 2017.

June 2016.[46] Furthermore, the Panel has received reports from arms experts in the region that there is evidence of some cross-border trade in weapons, both in and out of South Sudan, by suppliers along the borders with the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, although the number of weapons traded is reportedly small.[47]

C. Diversion of weapons

35. In late April and early May 2017, a heavily armed column of Bor Dinka conducted raids into areas of Jonglei populated by Murle, affecting Gumuruk and the areas around Pibor, during which civilians were reportedly targeted and subjected to cattle raids.[48] Independent sources indicate that the column was armed with 12.7-mm heavy machine guns; 60/82-mm mortars, PKM light machine guns and some 20 to 25 vehicles, including armoured personnel carriers, trucks and pickups. According to various sources who spoke with the Panel confidentially, the weapons were supplied directly by local SPLA commanders in Bor.[49] The Panel coordinator raised the issue with the President during a meeting in May 2017. The President did not deny that weapons diversion was occurring, although the Minister of Information and Broadcasting, Michael Makuei, who is from Bor and was also present, denied the reports. According to numerous sources in the Government, the President and Makuei argued over the issue of weapons being supplied to the Bor community at a subsequent meeting of the government's Council of Ministers, held on 5 May. Additional reports received in August indicate that weapons have also been diverted by political and military leaders to communities in Gogrial, thereby fuelling the violence between rival Dinka clans.[50]

VI. Conclusion

36. Since the Panel's previous public report in April 2017, peacemaking efforts in South Sudan have continued to be undermined by the actions of the Government and the various opposition groups, resulting in ongoing fighting throughout the country. Consequently, there has been no significant progress in the implementation of the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict. Attempts to reverse this trend have encountered resistance from elements within the Government who continue to pursue policies that have increased restrictions on information and closed the political space for dissent. The Panel continues to view an arms embargo and the imposition of individual targeted sanctions, recommended in its previous reports (S/2015/656, S/2016/70, S/2016/963 and S/2017/326), as important tools for shifting the focus of key leaders away from military options and towards political solutions.

[46] Interview with opposition officer, Juba, June 2016.

[47] Confidential reports provided to the Panel.

[48] Panel communications with members of the communities, senior South Sudanese military officers and politicians and members of the international community with knowledge of the conflict, April and May 2017.

[49] Information provided by three independent sources with direct knowledge of the conflict in Bor.

[50] Radio Tamazuj, "Special investigation: 11 influential leaders accused of fueling Aguok-Apuk conflict in Gogrial", 21 August 2017. Available from https://radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/11-influential-leaders-accused-of-fueling-aguok-apuk-conflict-in-gogrial-state.

United Nations S/2017/790

Security Council

Distr.: General
19 September 2017

Original: English

Letter dated 18 September 2017 from the Permanent Representatives of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Russian Federation and Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

We have the honour to forward to you the joint statement by the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Russian Federation and Turkey on the international meeting on Syria held in Astana on14 and 15 September 2017.

We should be grateful if you would circulate the letter and its annex as a document of the Security Council (see annex).

(*Signed*) Gholamali **Khoshroo**
Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran

(*Signed*) Vassily **Nebenzia**
Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation

(*Signed*) Feridun H. **Sinirlioğlu**
Permanent Representative of Turkey

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Annex to the letter dated 18 September 2017 from the Permanent Representatives of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Russian Federation and Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Joint statement by the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Russian Federation and Turkey on the international meeting on Syria in Astana, 14-15 September 2017

Astana, 15 September 2017

The Islamic Republic of Iran, the Russian Federation and the Republic of Turkey as guarantors of the observance of the ceasefire regime in the Syrian Arab Republic (hereinafter referred to as "Guarantors"):

- Reaffirming their strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic;
- Guided by the provisions of Security Council resolution 2254 (2015);
- Welcoming the significant reduction of violence on the ground in Syria as a result of measures aimed at maintaining and strengthening the ceasefire regime;

1. Express their satisfaction with the progress in implementation of the memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic of 4 May 2017.

2. Announce the creation of the de-escalation areas according to the memorandum of 4 May 2017 in eastern Ghouta, in certain parts in the north of Homs province, in Idlib province and certain parts of the neighbouring provinces (Latakia, Hama and Aleppo provinces) and also in certain parts of southern Syria (based on the Russian Federation initiative as a Guarantor of the Astana process, with the aim to ensure the ceasefire regime and territorial integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic and continue fight against terrorism).

3. Emphasize again that the creation of the de-escalation areas and security zones is a temporary measure, the duration of which will initially be six months and will be automatically extended on the basis of consensus of the Guarantors.

4. Emphasize that under no circumstances the creation of the above-mentioned de-escalation areas undermine the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic.

5. Allocate the de-escalation control forces of the three Guarantors on the basis of the maps agreed upon in Ankara on 8 September 2017 and in accordance with the terms of reference for deployment of de-escalation control forces prepared by the Joint Working Group on de-escalation on a temporary basis in the security zone in the de-escalation area in Idlib province and certain parts of the neighbouring provinces (Latakia, Hama and Aleppo provinces) with the aim to prevent incidents and clashes between the conflicting parties (the government of the Syrian Arab Republic and the armed opposition groups that have joined and will join the ceasefire regime).

6. Form a joint Iranian-Russian-Turkish coordination centre aimed at coordinating activities of de-escalation control forces in the de-escalation areas.

7. Emphasize progress in the fight against terrorism and elimination of Daesh/ISIL, Nusra Front and all other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities

associated with Al-Qaeda or Daesh/ISIL as a result of the launch of the above-mentioned de-escalation areas and reaffirm their determination to take all necessary measures to continue the fight against them within and outside the de-escalation areas.

9. Emphasize the need for the conflicting parties to take confidence-building measures, including the release of detainees/abductees and the handover of the bodies as well as identification of missing persons, to create better conditions for the political process and a lasting ceasefire.

9. Underscore the need to make use of the de-escalation areas for rapid, safe and unhindered humanitarian access and recall, in this regard, the relevant provisions of the memorandum of 4 May 2017.

10. Call upon the observers of the Astana process and other interested members of the international community to support the process of de-escalation and stabilization in Syria, inter alia, by sending additional aid to the Syrian people, facilitating the humanitarian mine action, preserving historical heritage, restoring basic infrastructure assets, including social and economic facilities.

11. Call upon the conflicting parties, representatives of the Syrian opposition and civil society to use emerging favourable conditions to step up efforts to give impetus to the intra-Syrian dialogue and advance the United Nations-led political process in Geneva as well as other initiatives, and to do so on an urgent basis.

12. Reaffirm their determination to continue implementing the provisions of the memorandum of 4 May 2017 and other decisions adopted earlier within the framework of the Astana process.

13. Express their sincere gratitude to the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, His Excellency Nursultan Nazarbayev and the Kazakh authorities for hosting in Astana the sixth high-level international meeting on Syria.

14. Decide to hold the next high-level international meeting on Syria in Astana at the end of October 2017.

United Nations S/2017/791

Security Council

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19 September 2017
English
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Letter dated 12 September 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the Sudan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have written several letters to the Security Council, the most recent of which was my letter of 17 July 2017 addressed to the Security Council (S/2017/616), regarding the Egyptian occupation of the Hala'ib triangle in the Sudan and its repercussions. In those letters, I described the measures taken by the Egyptian authorities to consolidate the occupation and impose facts on the ground that contravene international norms, instruments and provisions, including those related to international humanitarian law. I now wish to transmit herewith an updated report on the measures taken and violations committed recently by the Egyptian Government against Sudanese civilians in the occupied triangle. The Egyptian authorities have jailed or expelled civilians in a concerted attempt to Egyptianize the triangle, alter its demographic composition and consolidate the occupation (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Omer Dahab Fadl **Mohamed**
Permanent Representative

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 12 September 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the Sudan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Violations committed recently by the Egyptian Government against Sudanese civilians in the Sudanese Hala'ib triangle (Hala'ib, Shalatin and Abu Ramad)

The Egyptian authorities have carried out a campaign of searches and arrests in the three towns of the triangle (Hala'ib, Shalatin and Abu Ramad) and in the neighbouring areas along the border between the two countries. They have detained 222 Sudanese citizens living in the towns and villages of the triangle.

The detainees were taken to the prisons of Safaja, Ghardaqah and Marsa Alam in Red Sea governorate.

The arrests were made by various Egyptian military intelligence units in July and early August 2017, and particularly on 13, 22 and 26 July. Some detainees were taken individually, others in groups.

The civilians were detained on charges of rejecting the occupation and refusing to apply for identity documents. They were taken to prison. An attempt was made, in clear violation of international humanitarian law, to expel them from the areas where they have spent their entire lives.

The names of a number of civilians who were recently detained are set out below. Large numbers of them were expelled because they were found to have Sudanese passports. There are many others whose names we will provide you with in due course.

Annex: list of names of some of the detainees

1. Shams al-Din Mahdi Muhammad
2. Yusuf Abdulmajid Ibrahim
3. Hafiz Muhammad Arabi Yusuf
4. Ali Abdullah Ali Ibrahim
5. Abduh Abu Bakr Ishaq Adam
6. Umar Harun Abdullah Abu Bakr
7. Muhammad Ahmad Abulhasan Ahmad
8. Khalid Muhammad Adam Muhammad
9. Ayman Ahmad Aman Muhammad
10. Ibrahim Barma Ibrahim Abdulrahman
11. Faysal Abulqasim Adam Ibrahim
12. Qamaruldin Muhammad Yahya Muhammad
13. Abdullah Abu Bakr Muhammad Abdullah
14. Salih Abdulkarim Saghirun Salih
15. Bakr Musa Nuruldin Idris
16. Musa al-Zubayr Katufa

17. Ahmad Muhammad Dinaq Tawur
18. Mustafa Shanjaran Ali Imam
19. Sulayman Adam Muhammad Husayn
20. Abdullah Mahmud Muhammad Ahmad
21. Muhammad Ali Muhammad Shariq
22. Mahmud Haynah Abu Wali Muhammad
23. Muhammad Hashim Idrub Muhammad
24. Umar Abdulrahim Ishaq Umar
25. Bashir Uthman Ishaq Bashir
26. Muhammad Isma'il al-Khayyir Isma'il
27. Muhammad Yahya Adam Ibrahim
28. Yasir Ahmad Abdullah Adam
29. Uthman Muhammad Adam Sulayman
30. Nasruldin Yahya Adam Ibrahim
31. Abduh Adam Isa Ya'qub
32. Al-Nur Musa Muhammad Ahmad
33. Abdulrahman Dawud Ibrahim
34. Ahmad Adam Muhammad Ibrahim
35. Ibrahim Abu Bakr Idris Musa
36. Sha' al-Din Ibrahim Muhammad
37. Abu Bakr Muhammad Adam Mustafa
38. Abdulmajid Adam Abdulmajid Malik
39. Mustafa Adam al-Dawmah Abdullah
40. Adam Ibrahim al-Baqr Yahya
41. Ishaq Muhammad Kuku
42. Majdi Waysalun Tutu Kawah
43. Muhammad Isma'il Isa Ahmad
44. Shawqi Husayn Tahunah
45. Butrus Samuel Christopher Wani
46. Adam Abu Bakr Ahmad Sharafuldin
47. Abdulkarim Abdullah Hasan
48. Bakri Muhammad Makin
49. Siddiq Sharif Nawar Sharif
50. Al-Tayyib al-Nur Ibrahim
51. Bakri Ibrahim Bajur
52. Muhammad Ahmad Abdullah Musa
53. Isma'il Muhammad Isma'il

54. Dawud Akram Karakah
55. Abdullah Ibrahim Ya'qub
56. Mahmud Abdulrahman Kurdi
57. Philip Hasan al-Yadan
58. Alamuldin Abdullah al-Nayl
59. Al-Ghali Adam al-Ghali Abdullah
60. Jabir Sulayman Dakan
61. Muhajid John Majak
62. Sibt Dumna Basha Ali
63. Hasan Abduh Sulayman Adam
64. Ya'qub Ahmad Abdullah Adam
65. Kamal Khamis Jum'ah
66. Muhammad Fadl Abdulkarim Muhammad
67. Abu Bakr Arbab Abu Bakr Yahya
68. Mutawakkil Abdulmajid Abdullah
69. Hamid Surin Ajur
70. Al-Sadiq Abdullah Abkar Ibrahim
71. Bashir Uthman Musa Bashir
72. Sadiq Adam Abu Bakr Ishaq
73. Muhammad Zayn Khalil Umar
74. Idris Sulayman Uthman Ibrahim
75. Idris Abkar Isma'il Adam
76. Abkar Adam Abkar Ishaq
77. Uthman Harun Uthman Adam
78. Ishaq Ya'qub Ibrahim Uthman
79. Al-Dumah Abdullah Yahya Muhajir
80. Hafiz Matar Muhammad Abkar
81. Muhammad Adam al-Dumah Ahmad
82. Tariq Uthman Yahya Ya'qub
83. Abbas Muhammad Ali Muhammad
84. Izzuldin Ahmad Aba Bajr Harun
85. Muddathir Muhammad Adam Ya'qub
86. Bakri Abdullah Khayyir Adam
87. Majdi Muhamad Adam Mahmud
88. Yasir Muhammad Adam Musa
89. Ishaq Ibrahim Uthman Fadl
90. Salih Muhammad Adam Fadl

91. Daf'ullah Umar Ishaq Idris
92. Bakri Adam Abu Bakr Jasir
93. Muhammad Ya'qub Muhammad Yahya
94. Ammad Uthman Muhammad Adam
95. Sa'id Taha Ahmad Abkar
96. Uthman Muhammad Uthman Ali
97. Muhammad Harun Adam Dawud
98. Awad Muhammad Uthman Muhammad
99. Nafi' Uthman Muhammad al-Amin
100. Faysal Muhammad Ishaq
101. Nur Muhammad Idris
102. Samani al-Dumah Abu Bakr
103. Adam Hasan Yahya
104. Abdu Abdullah Hasan
105. Sharafuldin Sulayman
106. Al-Tijani Yahya Dawud
107. Abu Bakr Hasan al-Nur
108. Isma'il Abdullah Ya'qub
109. Siddiq Muhammad Abdullah
110. Abdu Isma'il Yahya
111. Isma'il Ya'qub Amr
112. Al-Nur Ishaq Ahmad
113. Ibrahim Rahmatullah Adam
114. Yahya Ammar Hammad
115. Amir Adam Ibrahim
116. Sulayman Abdullah Ya'qub
117. Marghani Abdulmahmud Marghani
118. Bashir Muhammad Mahdi Ahmad
119. Muhammad Ali Muhammad Ahmad
120. Muhammad al-Rih Muhammad Ahmadu
121. Mustafa Muhammad al-Ubayd Khidr
122. Ali Hasan Husayn Sa'id
123. Zakariya Data al-Nuh
124. Yahya Umar Hammad
125. Siddiq al-Khayyir Hasan
126. Nasir Harun Abdullah
127. Ibraim Yahya Ishaq

128. Muhammad Adam Ishaq
129. Al-Nadhir al-Nur Yahya
130. Amir Adam Ibrahim
131. Ahmad Adam Yahya
132. Mutawakkil Ali al-Majid Abdullah Zakariya
133. Ya'qub Ishaq Dawud Harun
134. Adam Yahya Abdullah Umar
135. Isma'il Abdullah Ya'qub
136. Adam Idris Ibrahim
137. Al-Tayyib Muhammad Ibrahim
138. Abdullah Izzuldin Adam Ibrahim
139. Ya'qub Dawud Yahya